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Abstract
We present a model where more accurate information on the background of individuals
facilitates statistical discrimination, increasing inequality and intergenerational persistence
in income. Surprisingly, more accurate information on the actual capabilities of workers
leads to the same result – firms give increased weight to the more accurate information,
increasing inequality and fostering discrimination. The rich take advantage of this through
educational investments in their children, lowering mobility. Using our model to inter-
pret the data suggests that a country like the US might be a land of opportunity for
the sufficiently able but where (for endogenous reasons) ability is strongly correlated with
background.
∗Corresponding author. School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, 31 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8
9JT, United Kingdom. Email: sevimora@gmail.com
1 Introduction
Intergenerational mobility is usually measured by the correlation between a proxy of the lifetime
income of parents and that of their children. With almost no exceptions, this correlation does
not control for the abilities of the children, but imagine for a moment that it did. The partial
correlation of parental income would then indicate the advantages that a child with richer parents
would enjoy vis-a`-vis another child with exactly the same abilities but a worse background. Our
point in this paper is to remark that a low partial correlation of parental income by no means
implies that the unconditional correlation needs to be low. We show that if a society is better
able to judge (and reward) individuals according to their true ability, then the unconditional
correlation (not controlling for ability) will necessarily increase, albeit the partial correlation
(controlling for it) could decrease. This is, societies that reward ability handsomely – and where
as a consequence the children of the rich do not enjoy advantages once ability is accounted for –
are bound to show larger inequalities and lower social mobility. The reason is that the process of
human capital accumulation implies that in those societies the differences between the abilities
of the children of the rich and the poor are bound to be high.
To study these issues, we develop a theory of human capital accumulation stressing the role of
statistical discrimination benefiting those from privileged backgrounds and the effects of having
imperfect objective information on an individual’s productive abilities.
In our model the income of an individual reflects the perception that society has on her pro-
ductive abilities, summarizing all the information that the market has on her. It partly reflects
what it is known about her abilities themselves, but also reflects any independent information
available on the agent’s background. This is because the market is aware that some backgrounds
are more conductive to human capital accumulation than others. In equilibrium, richer parents
tend to invest more in their children and, consequently, their children tend to be more produc-
tive. Thus, knowing the background of an individual is informative on their abilities, and this
information will be used by the market in determining their income even conditioning on the
direct information available about their abilities.
We present two main results. The first concerns the effects of having more information about
the background and abilities of individuals on inequality and mobility. It is not surprising that
more accurate information on background translates into a larger degree of inequality and lowers
intergenerational social mobility. This is because more information on background allows firms
to positively discriminate in favor of those with higher expected human capital. Moreover, and
perhaps more surprisingly, we show that the same effects (more inequality and less mobility)
appear as a consequence of the market having better information on the agent’s productive
ability – increasing the degree of “meritocracy” (in the sense of allowing firms to judge the
abilities of workers more accurately, independently of their backgrounds) has qualitatively the
same effects on inequality and mobility as giving more “advantages” to the rich (by means of
differentiating them more clearly from the poor and thus favoring them via positive statistical
discrimination).
The intuition for this result is as follows. By definition, in a “meritocratic” society the effect
of parental income should be very small when conditioning on the productivity of the agent, but
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these two variables (background and productivity) are not independent. More information on the
productive abilities of agents increases the differences in rewards that those agents receive as the
market is more efficient at differentiating the very productive from the less so. These differences
in income translate into differences in investment in the human capital of children, which results
in larger differences in their productive abilities and a greater correlation between the income
of parents and their children. In equilibrium this gets amplified by a feedback mechanism, as
larger inequality increases the value that the market assigns to any available information on an
individual’s talent.
Our second result concerns the effects of information (again, on background and on produc-
tivity) on the incentives of parents to invest in their children.
In a very meritocratic society (where firms will know the productivity of your children and pay
them accordingly), the return to educational investment will be large, and thus your investment
in your children will be larger than in a less meritocratic one.
In contrast, an increase in the information that the market has on the background of individ-
uals does not have the same effect. As we will see, it helps firms better guess the productivity of
agents (via statistical discrimination), but the effects on the incentives to educate children are
minimal for the obvious reason that your income level does not depend on the education that
your children have. Firms employing your children care more about what income you had, as it
helps them guess the education that your children received, but you cannot change their beliefs
about your children’s background by educating them more or less.
Thus, in societies with better information on productive ability, we should expect more
investment in education than in societies where “advantages” are more prevalent (i.e. statistical
discrimination based on background). But the former and the latter do not need to differ in the
degree of inequality and mobility.
Thus, our contribution is to stress that a low level of intergenerational mobility and a high
degree of inequality are perfectly compatible with a high degree of “meritocracy”, with people
being judged and rewarded according to their productive abilities. Moreover, two societies with
the same degree of mobility and inequality may have arrived at such a situation from very dif-
ferent routes. One may be characterized by people being judged and rewarded by their abilities,
while the other by the prevalence of advantages, the children of the rich being presumed to be
more productive than the children of the poor. From the point of view of mobility and inequality
both societies may look identical, but they differ radically in the incentives they provide to in-
vest in education. In the society where people are rewarded for their productive ability there are
strong forces conductive to high effort in educational investment, as this investment is likely to
be rewarded with future income. These forces are absent in a society where advantages prevail.
Our contribution is theoretical, but we perform an exercise that aims to provide an example
of the type of effects our mechanism could produce. We do the intellectual exercise of looking
at what the model implies for the degree of “meritocracy” in different societies. In particular,
we are interested in knowing if the implied degree of “meritocracy” in the US is large relative to
other countries.
When compared with other developed economies the US shows a very large degree of inequal-
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ity, a low degree of intergenerational mobility, and a very high level of investment in education.1
Following the logic of the model, it seems plausible that the US could have a large degree of
inequality and low mobility precisely because it has a high degree of “meritocracy”. We show
that that is indeed the manner in which the model reads the data.
The model is able to replicate the data only if the degree of implied “meritocracy” in the US
is much larger than in other OECD countries. If this were true, the US would still be a land of
opportunity provided that you have high productive ability. The low mobility and high inequality
in the US would be a reflection of the (endogenous) distribution of those abilities across people
and generations, not a failure to reward merit. In order to solve the model we make implausible
assumptions on the extent of redistribution and public education that are bound to overestimate
the weight of our mechanism. Thus, we are reluctant to interpret these results as evidence of the
distribution of meritocracy across societies. It is nevertheless a nice illustration of the mechanism
that we model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and discusses
semantics. Section 3 describes and sets up the model. Section 4 will look at the agent’s problem
and human capital investment. Section 5 will consider the firm’s problem and pricing the signals
on human capital and background. Section 6 will describe the steady state of the model and
section 7 will consider some comparative statics exercises on inequality and mobility. Section
8 will describe the equilibrium and comparative statics on educational investment. Section 9
shows the way in which the model filters existing data. Section 10 summarizes and concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Semantics and Related Literature
We are by no means the first to think along these lines. The word “meritocracy” itself was coined
(as recently as 1958) by sociologist Michael Young in his book “The Rise of Meritocracy”2 in
order to put forward some of the ideas that we model. Young’s book narrates an imaginary
history of the UK up to 2034 (the book is supposedly written in 2033). In the meritocratic
society it describes, positions are allocated based solely on merit, not on birth, but the book
describes a dystopia, not an utopia. The reasons are in essence the ones we describe. The
distribution of talent is endogenous to the workings of society. The high reward for talent
that meritocracy entails fosters inequality in the distribution of income. The education system
then tailors to the rich, who can afford more and better education for their children. Thus,
meritocracy fosters both inequality and persistence in income across generations. Young’s book
finishes with the death of the supposed author at the hands of an anti-meritocratic revolution
when those left behind by history rebel against what they perceive as the unbearable inequalities
that meritocracy has created.
Given that the word “meritocracy” has today a positive meaning, it is surprising to notice
1It is well known that intergenerational mobility correlates negatively with inequality. See Krueger (2012).
This correlation has been documented across countries (Corak (2013)), across US commuting zones (Chetty et al.
(2014)) and across Italian provinces (Gu¨ell et al. (2015)). The US is at the low mobility, high inequality end of
this relationship.
2Young (1958)
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that not even 60 years ago it was coined as a warning. It was recognized that it would give rise
to a feeling of justice and would foster short-run (perhaps even long-run) efficiency, but it was
doomed to increase inequality to the point of generating social instability.
We do not want to make a big deal about semantics, but it is necessary to clarify that
when we use the word “meritocracy” we will stick to its original meaning: the ability of society
to recognize the productive ability of individuals and reward them accordingly. For us it is
a statement about the availability of direct information on a worker’s productive ability. We
like to think of this information as the result of the education system signaling with more or
less accuracy the abilities of individuals. This itself could be a consequence of a more or less
widespread use of ability tests and the extension of systematic performance measures across
the schooling system. Alternatively, it could be the result of stratifying education via school-
rankings which select and signal their students abilities.3 In any case, for us this information is
an exogenous parameter characterizing society, and we call it the degree of “meritocracy” of a
society.
The important thing is the concept, though, not the word by which we name it. We recog-
nize that other people may have different conceptions on what “meritocracy” means, and some
people have strong opinions on this semantic issue. Clearly, many people associate the word
with a reduction of the privileges that some members of society may enjoy. These privileges
(which we might call “cronyism”) mean that some people may be rewarded far in excess to their
contribution to society. Examples would be the corruption in the allocation of public positions
via friendship or connections, or the impossibility of accessing higher education and positions
of power and substance without the benefit of parental wealth and connections. Notice that
the reduction of those privileges is not what we mean by “meritocracy”. It could be another
perfectly reasonable definition, but is not the one that we use, and it is not what Young meant
when he invented the word.
Since Becker (1957) we have known that irrational discrimination has negative effects not
only on those discriminated against, but also on the discriminator. Competition and market
forces should work against the extent of those privileges: a firm that hires a person because he
has an aristocratic name rather than talent, is a firm that will lose money and be driven out of
a competitive market. Thus, our approach is to model the advantages that the rich enjoy as a
result of rational statistical discrimination of firms with limited information.4 These firms know
that in equilibrium the children of the rich will have received a better education and are likely to
be more productive than the children of the poor. Discrimination is, thus, the rational response
to the available information, as in many statistical discrimination models such as Arrow (1973),
3Young’s book was a reaction to the extension of the tripartite education system in England, Wales and
Northen Ireland at the end of WWII. By this system children were examined at the age of 11 and selected into
one of three school types based on their performance. At the top, grammar schools would feed into university
(themselves selecting into further categories according to rank and student quality). At the bottom, students
would be trained in “practical skills”. Young’s book became paramount in the abolition of the system in the
70’s, with the introduction of the comprehensive school system that, at least in theory, offers the same education
to all.
4In any case, in appendix K we include “cronyism” (privileges not backed by reason) as an extension of our
analysis, and we show that their reduction does indeed decrease the intergenerational persistence of income and
(in most cases) the degree of inequality. Still, even in their presence the effects of improving the technology to
determine one’s ability (“meritocracy” in our sense) are qualitatively the same as in our main analysis.
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Coate & Loury (1993), Norman (2003) and Moro & Norman (2004). Simon & Warner (1992)
show that “old boys” networks improve information signaling for firms, explaining why referrals
from employeees account for a large percentage of hiring. Corak & Piraino (2011) show that
children are much more likely to work in the same firms as their parents than chance would
suggest.
Inefficient capital markets are another hurdle that the children of the poor endure. The
study of this in economics started with Galor & Zeira (1993) and has since created a large
literature. Nevertheless few papers, if any, study the effects of this in connection with the degree
of meritocracy. We do not take the route of exploiting credit market imperfections as generators
of inequality (our agents cannot access capital markets but, as the expected return to education
is homogeneous for all agents, they end up investing a fixed proportion of their income in their
children’s education ), but there is no reason why the effects of “meritocracy” would be different,
in such a case, from the ones we find.
A final related stream in the literature refers to the study of inequality and intergenerational
mobility pioneered by Becker & Tomes (1979). Several of those papers have dealt with un-
derstanding the negative relationship between inequality and mobility, a number of which hint
at the process of human capital accumulation as the possible cause. Hassler et al. (2007), for
instance, show that if the bulk of the difference across economies resides in the workings of the
labor market (skill bias or institutions), then the correlation between inequality and mobility
across economies would be positive. For the correlation to be negative (as the data shows it
is) the main differences across economies needs to be focused in the education system and the
process of education acquisition. Likewise, Solon (2004) shows that differences in the degree of
progressivity of the educational system generate the negative correlation observed.
A paper to which our work is particularly related is Abbott & Gallipoli (forthcoming). They
present a model that aims to explain the geographical differences in intergenerational mobility,
extending the Becker-Tomes model by introducing a production sector in which workers human
capital inputs are complements. This leads to a negative correlation between progressive public
policy and the intergenerational income elasticity. Computing the model, they show that geo-
graphic differences in skill complementarity directly account for roughly one fifth of cross-country
variation in intergenerational mobility.
3 Model Description
We present an overlaping generations model with two different set of actors: families and firms.
Agents work and receive a wage. The wage (the only state variable) is different for different
agents, and it is a function of their observable characteristics. They care about their own
consumption and the well-being of their children (with a certain discount rate). They have no
access to capital markets. The only decision they need to make is how much of their income to
consume and how much to invest in the education of their children. The only way of moving
resources forward in time is by investing in children’s education. There is no way of bringing
resources back from the future. Obviously, this investment depends crucially on the return to
education which is endogenous to the model and which parents take as given.
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Firms produce output competitively using only labor. The productive ability of each worker
(her “human capital”) is an stochastic function that depends positively on the investment that
her parents made in her. The production function is linear in the productive ability of workers:
output equals human capital one-to-one. Firms, though, cannot observe the productivity of
workers. They observe a set of characteristics of the workers, and need to infer the expected
human capital of each worker as a function of these characteristics. Firms, thus, pay each worker
her expected human capital and make zero profits on average.
The exact manner by which human capital affects income is endogenous to the model. Ac-
tually, our main contribution is to articulate the mechanisms by which this process takes place.
If firms were able to observe human capital exactly, income would be exactly equal to human
capital; but it is observed with noise. That is, the market has two pieces of information about
an individual: a noisy signal on her ability and another on her background. Firms determine
rationally how much to pay an individual as a function of her two signals.
The quality of each of these signals is exogenous. We say that a society is more “meritocratic”
if firms have better and more accurate information about the human capital of the individual:
if the signal on human capital is more precise. In addition to the signal on human capital, firms
use the available information on an agent’s background because they know that in equilibrium
richer parents invest more in education than poorer ones. Thus, there is statistical discrimina-
tion favoring children from better backgrounds, and in a society with better information on an
individual’s background the circumstances of birth play a larger role in income determination
even when conditioning on individual productive abilities.
The core of the paper consists of: (i) solving a dynamic general equilibrium model with
these three components (educational investment, meritocracy and inherited advantages); and
(ii) to show the comparative statics of the endogenous variables to exogenous changes in the
precision of the information available on the human capital of the agent (changes in the degree of
“meritocracy”) and the precision of the information on parental income (which directly facilitate
statistical discrimination) in the steady state. We show that better information (irrespective of
whether it is on merit or background) always has the effect of increasing inequality and decreasing
mobility.
We proceed by first exploring in section 4 the decisions of families given a certain stochastic
map from investment to income. The income process is endogenous to the economy, but the
family takes it as given.
Once we understand the investment decision of families we look at how much the market
values the different characteristics of workers in order to determine wages (in section 5) and the
income process.
We finally put both things together in section 8. In equilibrium parents use the resultant re-
lationship between investment and income to infer how much they should invest in their children
and how much to consume, thus closing the model.
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4 Human Capital Investment
We start by setting up the problem of families, which have to choose how much to consume and
how much to invest in their children’s education.
At each point in time the family consists of a parent and a child. After each period the
parent dies and the child becomes a parent.
There are no capital markets, so the resources of the family are exclusively the income
generated by the parent in the labor market. There is no way of borrowing in exchange for future
income, and there is no way of leaving resources for future generations except by investing in
one’s children. Thus, the only state variable is the income of the family.
The parent needs to allocate his resources between current consumption and investment in
his child’s human capital. This investment, and the income that the parent earned, will determine
the observable characteristics of the child.
Firms produce with human capital only, but they do not observe the human capital of
workers, only some informative characteristics about it. Consequently, their role is to decide
how to translate those observable characteristics into expected human capital and income.
Thus, the problem which parents confront is:
W
(
Y it
)
= max
Xit
{
lnC it +
1
1 + δ
EW
(
Y it+1|Y it , X it
)}
(1)
s.t.
C it = Y
i
t −X it ; X it ≥ 0 (2)
Y it+1 ∼ F
(
H it+1, Y
i
t
)
(3)
H it+1 ∼ G
(
X it
)
(4)
where Y it is the (lifetime) income of family i at generation t, C
i
t is their consumption, X
i
t
is their investment in the human capital of their offspring, and H it+1 is the human capital that
the offspring actually achieves. Equation 2 is the budget constraint that parents face given the
absence of capital markets. Equation 4 states that human capital is a stochastic function of the
investment, without a role for other forms of inheritance (genetic or otherwise).
The investment problem is quite standard. As in Becker & Tomes (1979, 1986), agents
decide how much to invest in the human capital of their children. We have assumed that
children’s innate abilities are stochastic, and parents invest without knowing the realization of
their children’s abilities. That is, there is a random component to the determination of human
capital, and when making the investment decision parents do not know how much human capital
their investment will translate into.
The novelty of our theory refers to equation 3. In the next sections we will develop a theory
such that in equilibrium the income of an individual is a stochastic function of her human capital
and her parental income, which has effects even controlling for the human capital of the child .
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of both human capital and parental income is a function
of the degree of inequality of the distribution of income, which is itself an endogenous object of
the model.
Equations 3 and 4 together imply a relationship between the income of a child and the
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income and investment made by their parent. We will begin, in this section, by taking as given
the following functional form for this relationship:
Y it+1 = e
γ0
(
Y it
)γ1 (
X it
)γ2
eε
i
t+1 (5)
where γ0, γ1 and γ2 are endogenous parameters of this income determination function and ε
i
t+1
is a stochastic error term with a certain mean ε¯ and variance Vε. At this stage we are guessing
that this is the correct functional form, but in subsequent sections we will show that this is, in
fact, the correct form of the income determination function and solve for the equilibrium values
of γ0, γ1 and γ2, and the stochastic structure of the random variable ε
i
t+1.
The last ingredient which we need to solve the parent’s maximisation problem, and find the
equation for the accumulation of human capital, is a functional form for equation 4. We assume
that it is:
H it+1 = Z
(
X it
)α
eω˜
i
t+1 ; ω˜it+1 ∼ N
(
−Vω
2
, Vω
)
(6)
where Z is a constant akin to total factor productivity, and ω˜it+1 is an iid shock normally
distributed with a mean such that E
(
eω˜
i
t+1
)
= 1. We assume that α ∈ (0, 1). Notice that an
agent may have very high human capital either because her parents invested a large amount in
her (large X it), or because she is very good at creating human capital (high ω˜
i
t+1). This second
route to excellence may be thought as luck or talent. Our only imposition is that it is not
inheritable.
The following result5 characterizes the optimal investment decisions of dynasties:
Result 1. The solution of the maximization problem in equation 1 requires that investment in
education is a fixed proportion of the individual’s income: X it = λY
i
t , with:
λ =
γ2
1 + δ − γ1 (7)
The value function of agents is W (Y ) = A+B lnY , with
A =
ε¯+ γ0 + ln [(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)][(1+δ)−(γ1+γ2)] + ln γ
γ2
2
[(1+δ)−γ1]
[(1+δ)−γ1]
[(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)] δ1+δ
(8)
B =
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2) (9)
Since parents invest a fixed fraction of their income, λ, in their child’s education, it follows
that, in absolute terms, the rich invest more heavily than the poor. Since this is a known feature
of the economy, the children of the rich will be perceived to have more human capital than the
children of the poor when human capital is unobservable. This leads to statistical discrimination
in favour of the children of the rich.
Notice also that as a consequence of investment being a fixed proportion of income (result 1)
and human capital having a constant elasticity to investment (equation 6), it follows that:6
5Proof in appendix A
6Proof in appendix B
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Result 2. Log human capital is a linear function of log parental income. The elasticity is an
exogenous parameter α, while the constant depends on the investment rate λ :
hit+1 = lnZ + α lnλ−
Vω
2
+ αyit + ω
i
t+1 (10)
where ωit+1 ∼ N (0, Vω) is iid noise and hit+1 and yit represent the log of the child’s human capital
and the log of parental income respectively.
This is the equation for the accumulation of human capital. Human capital depends positively
on parental income and the fraction of income which parents invest in their children. This
equation is known to firms but the level of human capital of a particular worker is not, nor is
the parental income of any particular worker (at least not perfectly).
5 Wage Determination
We now turn to how the wage of an individual is determined.
Agents can only produce output when working within firms. These firms are competitive in
the labor and product markets. The only input is human capital, which produces output on a
one-to-one basis.7
Our most salient assumption is that firms cannot observe the productivity of the workers.
They observe it with noise along with other characteristics of the agent. We call Ωit+1 the set of
information that the market has on agent i. We discuss the composition of this set below. So
far we just want to notice that it is public information referring to worker i. All firms have the
same beliefs on any particular worker. Thus, heterogeneity resides in how different workers are,
not in how they are perceived by society.
Competition ensures that firms will make zero expected profits in equilibrium and that the
wage of a worker with observable characteristics Ωit+1 equals the conditional expectation of her
productivity:
Y it+1 = E
[
exp
{
hit+1
} |Ωit+1] (11)
5.1 Information Available to Firms.
The set of information available to firms when determining the wage of worker i is composed of
four elements, two specific to the agent, and two summarizing the state of the economy at time
7 This view of production omits a role for misallocation in the sense that the productivity of a worker
is unaffected by the degree of error in firms’ beliefs about their human capital. This is done for simplicity.
Presumably though, if firms’ beliefs about each worker’s human capital were very different to the reality, agents
would be assigned to the wrong task and would not realise their full productive potential. In appendix L we
consider a production function which includes an allocative cost. This would seem to be more realistic, but the
added complexity does not change any of the results presented in the body of the paper.
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t:
Ωit+1 =
{
ait+1,m
i
t+1, µyt , Vyt
}
(12)
ait+1 = y
i
t + ε
ia
t+1; ε
ia
t+1 ∼ N(0, Va) (13)
mit+1 = h
i
t+1 + ε
im
t+1; ε
im
t+1 ∼ N(0, Vm) (14)
where ait+1 is a public signal on the parental income of agent i, and m
i
t+1 is a public signal on her
human capital. εiat+1 and ε
im
t+1 are iid noise shocks, and µyt and Vyt are the mean and variance of
the distribution of log-income in the parents’ generation. In addition, all firms know how human
capital relates to parental income (equation 10).
The two most important parameters for our model are Va and Vm. They determine the amount
of information that firms receive on the background of the agents (Va) and their productive ability
itself (Vm).
ait+1 is the signal on background, and Va determines how much information this signal con-
tains. If Va is very low, firms know with near certainty the income of the parents, and thus
how much was invested in the education of the agent. Notice that if Va is larger, the degree of
uncertainty that they have on the amount of education that the agent received depends on the
income distribution of the parents: the more inequality among the parents, the more uncertain
are the priors and, consequently, the posteriors. This fact will have important consequences.
mit+1 is the signal on the productivity of the agent, and Vm determines how much direct
information the market receives on it – how much firms know about the productivity of a worker
independently of her background and circumstances. It is the amount of “hard” information
available, unaffected by prejudice of any sort.
If Vm is very low, the firm knows almost exactly what the productivity of the worker is and
she will be paid accordingly independently of her background. The firm will pay the productivity
and it does not matter if she has a high h because the investment of the parents was high or
because she was particularly lucky in the drawing of ω˜ in equation 6.
If Vm is larger, the firm cares more about the background of the agent as it has predictive
value on h. In this sense we call “meritocracy” the precision of the signal mit. If it is high, only
the productive ability of agents matters for their wage. If it is low, firms are interested in the
background of the agent, which will affect her wage.
5.1.1 On critical events
Notice that our model is a model of the first years of the productive life of individuals. We
are implicitly assuming that during those years there are critical events in the personal history
of agents that determine their income thereafter. It is not an outlandish assumption, as there
is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that the first jobs have long lasting effects on her
working life.
There is direct evidence that early job stability has persistent wage effects (Neumark (2002))
and initial wage has persistent effects (Oreopoulos et al. (2012), Kahn (2010) or Oyer (2006)).
Moreover, Guvenen et al. (2017) show that the first years of labor experience account for an
extraordinarily large share of the total variance of lifetime income of individuals (and that it is
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the change in what happens over these early years which explains the trend in lifetime income
dispersion).
In order to rationalize these facts, a literature (starting with Mincer (1962)) has studied the
mechanisms of human capital accumulation and promotion, indicating that tracks are critical
in the wage process. Thus, Baker et al. (1994a) and Baker et al. (1994b) (see also Gibbons
& Waldman (2006)) show that initial tracks do matter. There are different tracks of jobs,
and if you start in a low wage track you tend to be promoted within the track, not towards
high wage tracks. As a result, the income differentials across workers with the same tenure
are somewhat persistent. Likewise, promotions have persistent effects: if you get promoted
first, your wage tends to be persistently higher. The rationale behind this behavior lies in
the process of human capital accumulation: you learn things specific to your track which make
occupational change costly. Thus, for instance, Pavan (2011) shows that wage growth is critically
affected by career and firm tenure, Kambourov & Manovskii (2009) and Sullivan (2010) show
that occupation-specific considerations are an important component of human capital, while
Gathmann & Schonberg (2010) and Poletaev & Robinson (2008) stress the importance of task-
specific considerations. Cortes & Gallipoli (2016) show (and rationalize) that there are large
costs of switching occupations. Under this reading our story should be interpreted as a shortcut
to modeling the decisions of choosing the first occupation from a menu of careers with persistent
wage differences.
University assignment is another obvious way in which agents have permanent shocks on
their lifetime incomes in their youth as a consequence of the perceptions that society has on
their abilities. It is easy to imagine a model where universities strive to get good students (as
they will eventually increase the university’s reputation, for instance) while facing imperfect
information on their ability. Merit and statistical discrimination would conflict in the same
manner as in our model. In the end, only so many students are admitted to MIT, which results
in a lifetime income bonus even for those of them who are not as capable as the team dealing with
admissions thought they were. In general, the process of admission to educational institutions
is, in all certainty, a critical part of the manner in which “meritocracy” affects society. In some
societies which elementary school you attend affects, in and of itself, the high school you will
attend, which itself determines the University you attend, and the prospects in life you will face.
Insofar as the process of admission at any of these levels is affected by parental income, even
if by the indirect channel of statistical discrimination, a process akin to the one we model will
appear.
It is by no means infeasible to model such a process, or to include career and occupation-
specific considerations. We have opted not to do so. First, because it would enormously compli-
cate the model without adding particular insight in the dimensions in which our theory is novel.
Second, because we would be unable to solve it analytically, our arguments losing some of their
sharpness. In any case, one could think of our model as a metaphor for those structures, and we
plan to explicitly include them in future work.
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5.2 Updating Beliefs
Firms process Ωit+1 in order to generate rational beliefs on agent i’s human capital, but before
knowing the specific values of the signals of any agent firms have a prior on the distribution of
human capital. This prior is generated by (i) the rule by which families invest in their children
(equation 10), including the distribution of “luck” in learning (ω) and (ii) the distribution of
income among parents. Clearly, if yt is normally distributed, the prior on h
i
t+1 will also be
normally distributed, and the larger the variance of parental income, the less precise the prior
of firms on the human capital of their children.
Once they receive the signals ait+1 and m
i
t+1 on a specific agent i, the market will update its
prior using Bayes rule. We summarize the outcome of this process in the following result:8
Result 3. Given the process of human capital accumulation in equation 10 and the information
set given by equation 12, the posterior of the log of human capital is given by:
hit+1|Ωit+1 ∼ N
(
µhit+1|Ωit+1 , Vhit+1|Ωit+1
)
(15)
with
µhit+1|Ωit+1 = βmt+1m
i
t+1 +
(
1− βmt+1
) [
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ α
{
βat+1a
i
t+1 +
(
1− βat+1
)
µyt
}]
(16)
Vhit+1|Ωit+1 = βmt+1Vm (17)
βat+1 =
Vyt
Vyt + Va
(18)
βmt+1 =
α2βat+1Va + Vω
α2βat+1Va + Vω + Vm
(19)
To understand the result it is easiest to first focus on expression 18. βat+1 is the weight given
to the signal on parental income when the firm updates its prior on the parental income of agent
i (determined by µyt and Vyt) with the information received in signal a
i
t. The posterior on log
parental income is:
{
βat+1a
i
t+1 +
(
1− βat+1
)
µyt
}
. Notice that the variance of the posterior on
log parental income is (1− βat+1)Vy which is smaller than the unconditional variance Vyt .
βmt+1 (equation 19) is the weight given to the signal m
i
t in the firm’s posterior on log human
capital. The expression
[
α2βat+1Va + Vω
]
is the variance of hit+1 conditional on a
i
t+1. The variance
of the posterior on log human capital is given by equation 17. Notice that βmt+1Vm can also be
written
(
1− βmt+1
) [
α2βat+1Va + Vω
]
, indicating that the variance of the posterior on log human
capital is smaller than the variance of hit+1 conditional on a
i
t+1.
The expected value of the productivity of agent i (equation 16) is a convex combination of
the realization of the direct signal on productivity (mit) and the expected log human capital for
an individual with log parental income equal to
{
βat+1a
i
t+1 +
(
1− βat+1
)
µyt
}
, the posterior belief
on log parental income given ait+1. Notice that if the signal on human capital is very accurate
(Vm → 0), then βmt+1 equals one, and income equals human capital exactly, independently of
its distribution within the population and independently of the background of the individual.
8Proof in appendix C
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But in any other case preconceptions matter for wage determination: the larger is the variance
of the merit signal, the larger is the weight given to the “prior” on log human capital. That
is, the larger is the weight given to the average human capital that you would expect from an
individual with the perceived background of the person being evaluated. Thus, Vm is indeed a
measure of how much background matters.
We now map these beliefs on hit+1 into wages. Notice that firms care about expected produc-
tivity, not its logarithm (which is normally distributed). We take care of this in the following
result:9
Result 4. The logarithm of the wage of individual i with signals ait+1 and m
i
t+1 is:
yit+1 =
(
1− βmt+1
) [
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ α
(
1− βat+1
)
µyt
]
+
βmt+1Vm
2
+ αβat+1
(
1− βmt+1
)
ait+1 + βmt+1m
i
t+1 (20)
Thus, log income is a linear function with three components:
• A constant that depends on the technology of human capital acquisition, how much the
average person invests in education (remember that λ is the share of income invested and
µyt the average of the log of income) and a factor that depends on the ex-post variance of
the distribution of human capital.10
• A term that depends on the information that society has on her specific background (ait+1).
We will call βˆat+1 = αβat+1
(
1− βmt+1
)
the “value” that society gives to background.
• A term that depends on the direct (“objective”) information that society has on her pro-
ductive ability (mit+1).
Large values of βmt+1 imply that society rewards highly the observed objective measures of
productive ability. Large values of βˆat+1 , on the other hand, imply that society rewards highly
the perception of a favored upbringing even controlling for the objective measures of ability. Of
course, both are endogenous. They depend not only on the precision of both signals, but also
on the distribution of income (and thus investment).
6 Steady State
We turn to the determination of these weights next, but before doing so it is convenient to
rewrite equation 20 as a stochastic income process: its Becker-Tomes representation. Noticing
that ait+1 and m
i
t+1 are both stochastic functions of y
i
t we can write the law of motion of the log
9Proof in appendix D
10 This is a property of the variance of the log normal: the larger the variance of the logarithm, the exponentially
larger is the expectation. It is the variance of the posterior of the distribution of log human capital that is relevant
here, not its unconditional distribution. Notice that the variance of the posterior is βmt+1Vm. A property of the
normal distribution is that this variance does not depend on the realization of any of the signals. This would not
be true with an arbitrary distribution function.
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of income:
yit+1 = lnZ + α lnλ−
Vω
2
+ α
(
1− βat+1
) (
1− βmt+1
)
µyt +
βmt+1Vm
2
+ α
[
βat+1
(
1− βmt+1
)
+ βmt+1
]
yit + αβa
(
1− βmt+1
)
εiat+1 + βmt+1
(
εimt+1 + ω
i
t+1
)
(21)
where the intergenerational income elasticity is then ρt+1 = α
[
βat+1
(
1− βmt+1
)
+ βmt+1
]
.
From here, after some algebra, we can determine the law of motion of the variance of log
income.
Vyt+1 = α
2
[
βat+1
(
1− βmt+1
)
+ βmt+1
]
Vyt + βmt+1Vω (22)
βat+1 =
Vyt
Vyt + Va
; βmt+1 =
α2βat+1Va + Vω
α2βat+1Va + Vω + Vm
This system of differential equations completely describes the dynamics of the model. Notice
that Vyt is not stochastic, given initial conditions, as there is no aggregate risk.
Before describing the properties of the steady state of the system we find it useful to make
two observations.
1. In our model there is no role for self-fulfilling expectations. Expectations never drive the
dynamics.
This sets our model apart form the bulk of the literature on race- or gender-based statis-
tical discrimination. In that literature the observed characteristic has no intrinsic value
as there is nothing inherently good or bad in belonging to a given race or gender. Never-
theless, the fact that a characteristic is observable may make it acquire informative value:
if everybody expects people of a certain race or gender to act in a certain way (investing
little in education, for instance), it might be optimal to privately act in accordance with
such an expectation (you will invest little in education if people expect you to have little
education and it is your race, not your education, that is observed).
Multiple equilibria are natural in such an environment, as the informative content of an
observable characteristic depends on how people are expected to act and those expectations
feed back into actions. Other expectations would lead to other actions, and those actions
could feed those different expectations. Most obviously: the race or gender that is expected
to have lower education could be changed and nothing of substance would be altered.
Our model is very different in this respect because it is objectively good to be the child of
rich parents, and it is objectively good to have high productive ability. There is no way
of sustaining an equilibrium where low income parents invest in their children as much as
rich parents do, as the marginal utility of consumption of poor parents is larger. It is easy
then to see that the market will always discriminate against the children from deprived
backgrounds. If it did not, the rich would still invest more in their children than the poor,
so it would be irrational not to discriminate. Likewise, an individual with a large value of
mt is always going to be paid more than another that differs only in having a lower value
of mt. More productivity is more productivity, and there is no other conceivable way of
interpreting it.
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2. There is a positive feedback mechanism by which inequality fosters further inequality.
On the one hand, the more inequality there is (large Vyt), the more heterogeneous agents
are in their productive ability, and the more uncertainty firms face. Consequently, the
market more heavily rewards indications of productive ability, both the direct ones (mit),
and the suggestive ones via parental investment (ait). βat+1 and βmt+1 are increasing in Vyt .
On the other hand, the larger the value given to the signals (βmt+1 and βat+1), the larger
the amount of inequality the next generation will endure, as the differences among agents
are more salient.
Thus, the more that society values the observable differences between agents, the more
inequality it creates, and because of that, the more that it values the observable differences
between agents. Or, looking at it from the other side, inequality fosters further inequality
via increasing the extent to which society differentiates among its members. This positive
feedback mechanism is ingrained in the process of statistical discrimination. It implies
a multiplier effect: the effect of any exogenous change in parameters which leads to an
increase in inequality will be amplified.11
Thus, our model does not allow for the existence of different sets of strategies and beliefs
which could be mutually compatible for a single set of state variables: equilibrium is unique.
Nevertheless, the existence of the positive feedback mechanism generates the possibility of mul-
tiple path dependent steady states. This happens if different values of the state variables lead
you to different steady states in the long run, but there is no possibility of moving form one of
those steady states once the economy has settled in it.
In our model multiple steady states arise if the elasticity of human capital to investment is
large enough. If α ≥ 1 there are three steady states, of which two are stable. Of these one
has infinite variance, with ρ being not smaller than one and huge responses to a and m. The
other stable equilibria is qualitatively identical to the one that we present for α < 1. We prefer
to restrict the parameter space to ensure that this possibility does not arise. There are three
reasons for this: (1) because we do not know how to interpret infinite variance , (2) because the
restriction necessary (α < 1) is eminently reasonable , and (3) because the steady state that
results is equivalent with the reasonable (i.e. finite variance) stable steady state if the restriction
does not apply. From now on we always assume that α < 1.
We characterize the solution of this system of differential equations in the next result.12
Result 5. If α < 1 equations (18), (19) and (22) define a system of differential equations with a
unique steady state which is globally stable. In the steady state log income is normally distributed
11Proof in appendix E
12Proof in appendix F.
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with variance being characterized by the (unique) solution to the following system of equations:
Vy =
βmVω
1− α2 [βa (1− βm) + βm] (23)
βa =
Vy
Vy + Va
(24)
βm =
α2 βa Va + Vω
α2 βa Va + Vω + Vm
(25)
Unfortunately, the explicit solution to this system of equations is extremely cumbersome
and uninformative. We can instead solve analytically the comparative statics on the relevant
exogenous variables. That is, we look at how the steady state values of the endogenous variables
(Vy, βa and βm) move as a consequence of exogenous changes in Va and Vm.
7 Comparative Statics Exercises
The following section lays out the main theoretical results of our paper.
7.1 An Exogenous Increase in the Amount of Information on Back-
ground
A decrease of Va means that the market will have more accurate information on the background
of agents. This is not good news for equality. Being better able to differentiate who received
more education, the market will be more inclined to discriminate in their favor, providing greater
advantages to those from aﬄuent backgrounds. But how much the market chooses to discriminate
is a function of the degree of inequality in the economy, and this is a state variable whose path
is determined endogenously.
In appendix G we prove the following result, which characterizes the effects of Va
Result 6. An increase in the accuracy of the signal on background (a decrease of Va) results, in
steady state, in more inequality, greater persistence of income across generations, more discrim-
ination based on perceptions of the background of an agent, and a smaller elasticity of income to
the signal on ability:
dVy
dVa
< 0;
dρ
dVa
< 0;
dβa
dVa
< 0;
dβˆa
dVa
< 0;
dβm
dVa
> 0 (26)
More accurate information on the background of an individual increases the attention that
firms give to this signal, increasing the persistence of income across generations and its variance
across individuals.
Notice that this result is far from obvious: Decreasing the amount of noise in the economy
(i.e., increasing the information that agents have) increases the dispersion of incomes. You
reduce noise, but as result you increase dispersion.
The reason lies in the increase in the persistency of the income process. Better information on
the background of the individuals allows firms to discriminate more accurately between agents,
16
directly favoring those from better backgrounds. A more persistent income process is bound
to have a larger unconditional variance. Thus, inequality increases, which itself increases even
further the value of the information on background via the positive feedback mechanism discussed
above.
Notice also that the effect on the human capital signal (βm) is the opposite. Better infor-
mation on background results in a lower elasticity of income to the ability of individuals. This
might look surprising, given that inequality is larger. More inequality implies that firms are less
aware on the abilities of any specific worker, and thus, one could have expected that firms would
give more attention to the meritocratic signal of human capital (mit). They do not, and the
reason is that, albeit the unconditional variance of income increases, the variance of log income
conditional on the signal ait decreases. Thus, the dispersion of human capital conditional on a
i
t
decreases, and there is less demand for the meritocratic signal. There is a crowding-out effect,
background replacing merit in the determination of one’s income and, consequently, a profoundly
antipathetic decrease of intergenerational mobility.
7.2 An Exogenous Increase in the Degree of Meritocracy
Next we want to consider the effect of exogenously reducing Vm. A reduction in Vm, all else
equal, improves the quality of the human capital signal, providing greater advantages to those
with greater human capital. With all the caveats discussed in section 2, we consider it reasonable
to say that a society with a lower value of Vm is more “meritocratic”.
The first thing to notice is that the same feedback mechanism that is very obvious for
information on background, acts in the same manner for the information on merit. The easiest
way to see this is by assuming that there is no signal on background (Va →∞). In such a case
the law of motion (22) becomes:13
Vyt+1 = α
2βmt+1Vyt + βmt+1Vω; βmt+1 =
α2Vyt + Vω
α2Vyt + Vω + Vm
(27)
More information on merit (lower Vm) induces the market to rely more heavily on such
information, increasing βmt+1 . This necessarily increases the spread of incomes, as the differences
between agents become more salient. Finally, the increase in inequality makes firms less sure of
the human capital of their workers in the following generation, increasing the value that they
assign to any information on merit, increasing βm further.
It is easy to see that the unique steady state of (27) is the unique solution to:
Vy =
βmVω
1− α2βm (28)
βm =
α2Vy + Vω
α2Vy + Vω + Vm
(29)
and that the steady state values of Vh, Vy and βm are all decreasing in Vm. The intergenerational
income elasticity (now equal to αβm) increases as Vm is reduced.
13Notice that as Va approaches infinity, then βat+1 → 0 and βat+1Va → Vyt
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Contrary to what could be thought, meritocracy does not increase the degree of intergen-
erational mobility. It decreases it. More information on people’s ability is bound to decrease
intergenerational mobility because ability and background are correlated and, by increasing in-
come dispersion, meritocracy increases the value of any existing information on people’s ability.
The children of the rich, being on average more productive than the children of the poor, benefit
from the increase in the accuracy of information on merit, leading to more persistent income
shocks and further inequality. Meritocracy has very much the same effects as an increase in the
information available on background.
It is now easier to consider the effect of an exogenous improvement in the quality of the
human capital signal when both signals are available and useful to the firm (i.e. Va is finite).
We do so in the following result.14
Result 7. An increase in the accuracy of the signal on ability (a decrease of Vm) results, in steady
state, in more inequality, greater persistence of income across generations, a larger elasticity of
income to the signal on ability and more weight given to the signal on background when evaluating
an agent’s parental income (which is what βa measures):
dVy
dVm
< 0;
dρ
dVm
< 0;
dβm
dVm
< 0;
dβa
dVm
< 0 (30)
Moreover, given a set of values for α ∈ (0, 1) and Va ∈ R+ (Va <∞) , there exists a variance
of the error in the signal on ability, Vˆm, such that
(
0 < Vˆm <∞
)
If Vm < Vˆm, then
dβˆa
dVm
> 0 (31)
If Vm > Vˆm, then
dβˆa
dVm
< 0 (32)
The value of βˆa, the weight given to the signal on background when evaluating an agent’s human
capital, is maximal if Vm = Vˆm.
If society is better endowed to judge its members’ merit, it is doomed to increase the disper-
sion of their incomes (paying more to those judged to be better). This increased dispersion has
effects on both the value assigned to merit, βm, and the value assigned to “advantages”, βˆa.
First, it increases the dispersion of the abilities of the children, thus feeding back into in-
creased underlying uncertainty and the value of the signal on human capital in the following
period. Thus, not surprisingly, better information on human capital increases the market value
of that signal.
The effects on the weight given to background when determining income (βˆa) are more
complicated. First of all, there is a “crowding-out effect” in the opposite direction to that in
result 6. Better information on human capital makes you place less weight on background as
merit replaces inherited advantages in the determination of human capital. This is clear from
the fact that βm enters negatively in βˆa = αβa (1− βm). However, there is an effect on the other
direction too: as income variance increases, the signal on background becomes more valuable in
14Proof in appendix H
judging parental income. This increase in βa acts in the opposite direction to the increase in βm.
The net effect on βˆa depends on the relative size of the effects on βa and βm.
We can understand the net effect by doing the following mental exercise. Imagine that Vm
were very low (and thus, firms have good information on ability). In that case βm would be very
large (close to one), and the effect of the increase of βa would be very small
(
∂βˆa
∂βa
= α (1− βm)
)
.
The net effect of a decrease in Vm would be an increase in the market value of the human capital
signal, but a decrease in the value of the parental income one. There would be a trade-off
between meritocracy and advantages as the crowding-out effect dominates.
Now imagine the polar opposite case where Vm is very large. In such a case βm would be
close to 0 and background information would play the dominant role in the determination of
human capital. Any increase in the quality of information on ability would increase the market
value of both signals because, in this case, the effect of an increase in βa on βˆa is relatively large.
In any case, notice that the degree of intergenerational mobility always decreases whenever
the society becomes more meritocratic as a consequence of a decrease of Vm. This occurs both
when there is a trade-off (and advantages become less important) or when there is not. This
is a consequence of inheritance. The talented become richer, and thus incomes are bound to
become more dispersed. This increased dispersion of incomes is going to be translated into a
further dispersion of abilities as the rich invest more in their children. Abilities then, being
better evaluated, translate into more income for the children of the rich even if it is perfectly
possible that firms care less about the background of agents.
This is one of the main insights of our paper. Meritocracy in and of itself is not going to
increase intergenerational mobility or decrease the prevalence of inheritance. And this is bound
to happen even if an increase in meritocracy does produce a decrease in the advantages associated
with being from a good background, which is by no means a foregone conclusion.
This is not to say that meritocracy is a bad thing. In the next section we show that it
increases the share of income invested in human capital. The significance of our result is to
notice that there are several roads that lead to countries having low intergenerational mobility
and high inequality: one is the “aristocratic” route, where the children of the rich benefit from
positive statistical discrimination as the rich are known to invest more heavily in their children’s
education than the poor; but a very different road leading to the same mobility and inequality
is the meritocratic one. If the aspects of reality that one focuses on are limited to the degree of
mobility and inequality, meritocracy and the weight of background are almost equivalent. Both of
them produce a negative correlation between inequality and mobility, reproducing the observed
data. Thus, just looking at the data we cannot say if a society is more or less meritocratic. For
doing so we need to find a variable that reacts differently to advantages and to meritocracy. We
do so in the next section.
8 Equilibrium
The log-normal structure of the model has allowed us to do the rather unusual exercise of solving
for the comparative statics in steady state of a set of the endogenous variables (Vy, βa and βm)
without solving the complete model. This facilitates our analysis enormously by making the
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pricing decisions independent of the share of investment in education (λ), insofar as all parents
invest the same share of their income, which we saw in section 4 was the case. Now we solve for
the complete equilibrium, including investment in human capital.
An equilibrium consists of (i) a rule for parents’ investment behavior and (ii) an income
determination process such that:
1. The investment behavior of parents is optimal given the income determination process.
2. The income determination process is such that the wage of each worker equals her ex-
pected productivity given the information available on the worker (Ωit) and the investment
behavior of parents.
In section 4 we saw that if parents believe that the income of their children is going to be
determined by Y it+1 = e
γ0 (Y it )
γ1 (X it)
γ2 eε
i
t+1 (for some values of γ0, γ1, γ2 and stochastic process
εit+1), then they choose optimally to invest a fixed proportion of their income λ =
γ2
1+δ−γ1
.
In section 5 we saw what the stochastic process of income is if parents invest a fixed proportion
λ of their income in their children.
Thus, in order to prove that we have located an equilibrium it remains to be shown that
there exists values of γ0, γ1, γ2 and a well defined stochastic process ε
i
t+1 such that equation (5)
is a representation of the stochastic process of income defined by equation (20) in result 4 for
the values of Vy, βa and βm obtained in result 5. We do so in the following result.
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Result 8. Equilibrium. The equilibrium stochastic process of income as a function of parental
income and investment is Y it+1 = e
γ0 (Y it )
γ1 (X it)
γ2 eε
i
t+1 with:
γ0 = lnZ + α (1− βm) [(1− βa)µy + lnλ] + 1
2
[βmVm − Vω] (33)
γ1 = αβa (1− βm) (34)
γ2 = αβm (35)
εit+1 = αβa (1− βm) εait+1 + βm
(
ωit+1 + ε
mi
t+1
)
(36)
and, consequently, the equilibrium share of income invested in children’s education is:
λ =
αβm
1 + δ − αβa (1− βm) (37)
The elasticities of income with respect to parental income and investment are αβa (1− βm)
and αβm respectively. The portion of talent which is not derived from parental income (ω
i
t)
plays a larger role in the determination of income when βm is higher, implying it has a more
substantial impact in more meritocratic societies.
From results 5 and 8 we derive the following corollary, which describes the equilibrium.
Result 9. If α < 1 there exists an unique steady state. In steady state the values of Vy, βa and
βm are the unique solution to:
Vy =
βmVω
1− α2 [βa (1− βm) + βm] ; βa =
Vy
Vy + Va
; βm =
α2 βa Va + Vω
α2 βa Va + Vω + Vm
15Proof in appendix I.
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The intergenerational correlation of income equals
ρ = α [βa (1− βm) + βm]
and the share of income invested in human capital is in all families identical, and equals
λ =
αβm
1 + δ − αβa (1− βm)
Given that we have already seen the comparative statics of Vy, ρ, βm and βˆa with respect to
Vm and Va, all that remains to be shown is how the investment rate λ responds to those variables.
We start with Vm. It is quite intuitive that if firms are very well informed about the pro-
ductivity of workers, parents will want to invest a large share of their income in their children’s
education. This is because, in that case, children’s income necessarily depends on their productiv-
ity and not on other considerations that could be inferred from their background. Consequently,
the return to investment in education becomes large: it translates readily into future income.
Thus, the following result is not surprising:16
Result 10. An increase in the accuracy of the human capital signal (a decrease of Vm) results,
in steady state, in an increase in the proportion of income invested in education.
Notice that in our context parents want to educate their children only insofar as the market
values how productive they look. Thus, educational investment is very sensitive to βm. If βm is
very low, you will not invest in your children not because it does not raise the human capital
of your child, nor because it does not raise their human capital signal, but because the market
does not value that signal. The low rewards to the human capital signal mean you would rather
eat the resources.
This is a strong force by which parents respond to the greater rewards to education arising
from a more accurate human capital signal. This force works in exactly the opposite way in
response to an increase in the accuracy of the information available on background. As we saw
in result 7, a decrease of Va produces a steady state decrease in βm, decreasing the return to
investing in education.
There is, though, an additional force at play which complicates the analysis following a
decrease of Va: insofar as parental investment still raises agent’s incomes, it can be used to
generate advantages for more distant generations of the family through the perception that
richer parents provide. Specifically, by raising the income of children, educational investment
raises the advantages of grandchildren, greatgrandchildren and so on. This occurs through the
statistical discrimination on background which firms use to determine wages. Thus, in societies
where information on background is more readily available, and perceptions on background are
more heavily rewarded by firms, this creates an incentive to invest more.
This complicates the analysis of the response of investment to an increase in accuracy of the
signal on background, which we summarize in the following result 17
16Proof in appendix J.
17Proof in appendix J.
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Result 11. An increase in the accuracy of the signal on background (a decrease of Va) may
increase or decrease investment. Moreover, for a value of Vm low enough, it necessarily decreases
it.
Thus, Vm and Va have different effects on λ. In the next section we will use these differences
to identify the degree of meritocracy and the prevalence of advantages in different societies.
9 A Numerical Illustration
The existing data on on inequality and intergenerational mobility is often interpreted in public
discussion in terms of meritocracy and the prevalence of advantages. Thus, when a society is
shown to have relatively low intergenerational mobility it is often understood to be not mer-
itocratic, at least in comparison to another society with more intergenerational mobility. Our
model contradicts such a view, our main insight being that, given the complexities of the trans-
mission of inheritance, one should be cautious when extrapolating from the existing data on
intergenerational mobility and inequality to the causes of the patterns seen in this data.
Thus, while the motivation and the main contribution of this the paper is eminently the-
oretical, it is interesting to see how the model interprets such data. We have seen that two
societies showing similar levels of inequality and mobility could have arrived at such a point via
different routes. For instance, Italy and the US have similar levels of mobility and inequality,
but it is perfectly possible that one may have a high degree of meritocracy and low prevalence
of advantages, while the other may be just the reverse.
Moreover, in the light of the model it is perfectly possible that a society has less intergen-
erational mobility than another while paying individuals much more according to the objective
measures of their productivity and less as a function of their background. Thus in principle, the
US could have a higher intergenerational correlation of income than Sweden, while still being
more meritocratic.
The objective of this section is to look at how our model maps the existing data into the
degree of meritocracy and the prevalence of advantages of different societies. It is by no mean
an empirical “test” of the model, and we do not want to read the results in a literal sense. All
models are “wrong”, in the sense of being a simplification, and when dealing with complex issues
(such as inheritance and advantages), in order to be comprehensible, they need to abstract from
many issues that are undoubtedly relevant.
Nevertheless, a model is better than no model. The naive reading of the data that is normally
made (less mobility equals less meritocracy and more prevalence of advantages) implies a much
bigger oversimplification, if not a logical fault. Consequently, the natural next step is to measure
the degree of meritocracy and the prevalence of advantages that our model suggests exist in
different societies.
9.1 Procedure
Obviously, there exists no direct data on βm or βˆa, much less on Va and Vm. All that is available
is data on intergenerational income correlations, ρ, inequality, Vy, and human capital investment
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rates, λ. Our goal is to use this data in order to reveal (for any society j) the values of V ja and
V jm (and thus β
j
m and βˆ
j
a) that would generate values for ρ
j, V jy , and λ
j within the model that
are the closest possible to the data values. To clarify notation, from now on we will include an
index j ∈ {1, ..., J}, indicating the society (country) to which we are referring.
We assume that societies differ in the amount of information available for firms to evaluate
workers’ productivity (V jm), and background (V
j
a ).
18 The other three parameters in the model
(α, Vω and δ) are assumed to take the same value across all societies.
The discount rate δ is assumed to be 1% annually in our central exercise.19 We also look at
other values for δ in our sensitivity analysis in Appendix O. It is difficult to postulate, a priori,
numerical values for the elasticity of human capital accumulation to educational investment (α)
or the variance in the process of exogenous shocks in the acquisition of human capital (Vω).
Therefore we calibrate these parameters within a very comprehensive and internally coherent
data set, due to Chetty et al. (2014), which describes variation across US commuting zones. This
exercise is described in Appendix M.20
We obtain values of α = 0.409 and Vω = 1.038 for use in our central exercise. We also look
at other values for α and Vω in our sensitivity analysis in Appendix O.
Location specific values for V jm and V
j
a , together with the common values of α, δ and Vw,
generate model values for the variables for which we have counterparts in the data. Specifically,
within the model we get the degree of intergenerational mobility ρj, the degree of inequality V jy ,
and the investment in education λj. Our goal is to find the values of V ja and V
j
m, for all countries
j ∈ {1, ..., J}, such that the model values of these variables (V jy , ρj and λj, ∀j) are the closest
possible to their data counterparts (Vˆ jy , ρˆ
j and λˆj, ∀j).
18In addition to V ja and V
j
m societies could differ in the process of human capital accumulation. In our model
these differences would be captured in the intercept Z in equation 6. In principle we could also calibrate Zj for
each country j, and include average income as another target, but notice that such extension would be irrelevant.
The reason is that differences of productivity in the human capital accumulation function would map one to one
into differences in average income, and not affect the rest of model variables at all. We would match average
income exactly, because we have an extra variable for each country dedicated to that task. Given that this
variable does not affect our variables of interest this seems a fairly futile exercise and we ignore cross country
heterogeneity in the human capital accumulation process.
19The model discounts across periods using a factor equal to 1/(1+ δ). We assume a period is a generation, or
approximately 30 years, and so we want δ such that 1/(1+ δ) = (1/1.01)30 i.e. we use δ = 0.348 to be equivalent
to a 1% annual discount rate over a period lasting 30 years.
20We use the Chetty et al. (2014) data across the approximately 700 US commuting zones to produce estimates
for α and Vω rather than doing this within the international data set, with 15 observations, for two reasons.
Firstly, it is clear that 700 >> 15 and so better estimates are likely. And secondly, the US commuting zone data
is likely much more internally consistent: for example, the share of income invested in education between two
commuting zones is likely to measure (however imperfectly) precisely the same conceptual object; conversely, the
share of income invested in education between two countries may measure different objects as different statistical
agencies are involved in the primary collection of this data and different definitions may be used. As well as
using this exercise to produce our central estimates for α and Vω, it also produces estimates of the precision of
the signals on merit and advantages across US commuting zones. These can be mapped and correlated with
observable commuting zone characteristics (also from the Chetty et al. (2014) data). The results of this are
shown in Appendix M and we believe it is an interesting exercise. Across US commuting Zones the prevalence of
merit seems to correlate well with having a large service sector and large foreign communities, while the fraction
of African-Americans and racial segregation correlates well with the prevalence of inherited advantages. We do
not include this analysis and these results in the main body of the paper as this puts too much emphasis upon
empirical applications, which the model is not really capable of supporting (due to its omission of public education
and redistribution). The rhetorical point, that a reasonable model can allow high degrees of meritocracy to co-
exist with low levels of mobility, and that indeed our model reads the data for certain countries in this way, is
best made using the international data.
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Figure 1: The Great Gatsby Curve
We look for the values of {V jm, V ja } ∀j that minimize the following objective function:
min
{V jm,V ja}
∀j
L =

 (1− Corr [ρˆ, ρ])
2 +
(
1− Corr
[
Vˆy, Vy
])2
+
(
1− Corr
[
λˆ, λ
])2
+
(
ln ρ¯D − ln ρ¯M)2 + (ln V¯ Dy − ln V¯ My )2


where the elements of the first line of the objective function are (one minus) the correlation
across countries between the model moments and their data counterparts. Thus, for instance,
Corr [ρˆj, ρj] is the correlation across all countries between the model generated values for ρ (as a
consequence of {V jm, V ja }∀j) and their data counterparts ρˆ. The second line of the loss function is
the square of the difference between the model and data values of the means of ρ and Vy across
all countries.
We maximize the correlations, instead of minimizing the square errors, of the moments
because in this way we normalize the magnitudes of the three variables, giving them effectively
equal weight. The loss is convex in the square of the correlation mistake, indicating that we
prefer to equate the loss across the three moments. Notice that this does not fix either the mean
or the variance of the moments. That is, the mean and variance of the moments of the data
could be vastly different than the ones in the model, while the correlation could be high. In
order to avoid this we also account (in the second line) for the deviations of the mean of ρ and
Vy from the ones observed in the data.
Note two things. First, we could also account for deviations in the variances. We choose not
to do this in order to have some untargeted moments so as to check how good the fit is. Second,
we do not include the mean or the variance of λ because, as we discuss later, we believe there are
strong reasons why the data we have for this is only indicative of the variation in this variable,
and says little about its level.
The optimization algorithm is explained in detail in appendix N.
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9.2 International Data
The discussion on the pre-eminence of inheritance and the possible end of the American dream
has focused a substantial amount of attention in the so-called “Great Gatsby Curve”.21 This
is a relationship between the degree of inequality and a measure of the intergenerational per-
sistence of income across countries, which we depict in figure 1. This positive correlation has
been documented across countries (Corak (2013)), across US commuting zones (Chetty et al.
(2014)) and across Italian provinces (Gu¨ell et al. (2015)), among others. The existence of such
a relationship across locations within a country, which clearly share the same institutional and
redistributive environment, is indicative that this relationship is not caused only by differing
levels of redistribution (as exist across countries).
The data on the intergenerational correlation of income between parents and children is from
Corak (2013). In Figure 1 we depict its relationship both with the degree of inequality before
(red squares in the plot) and after (blue triangles) taxes and redistribution.
This data has received much attention, and the relationship indicates that societies showing
less inequality are more likely to show more mobility, which is not in itself particularly surprising,
and has been extensively discussed in the literature22. What did get the public attention was the
fact that the US is at the dismal extreme of the curve: the US has a very low degree of mobility
and a large degree of inequality irrespective of how inequality is measured. When looking at
pre-tax income inequality, the US is very much in the same place as Italy and much worse than,
for instance, the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, when looking at post-tax and redistribution
inequality the relationship is unaltered (more inequality, less mobility) while the US remains
at the dismal extreme. This has been read as indicating that the US is no longer the land of
opportunity, but one where merit is secondary to privilege.
It is naturally appealing to check whether our model reads the data as indicating that the
prevalence of merit within the US is relatively large or small. From the point of view of our
theory, this data could imply the usual, naive interpretation in which meritocracy is equivalent
to mobility (i.e., relatively low values of βm in the US), or just the opposite. We look at the
degree of meritocracy and the prevalence of advantages that our model suggests that could have
generated the observed data across the different countries. As we shall see, countries that look
similar on the “Great Gatsby Curve” can be very different in meritocracy-advantage space. In
particular, some countries with very low mobility appear to be highly meritocratic.
As well as using the Corak (2013) values for the intergenerational correlation of income
between parents and sons across countries, and OECD data on the distribution of income, we
also use OECD data on the level of educational investment. In order to abstract from issues
that might depend on the stage of development, we opt to do our exercise only with developed
countries.23 Our data set then consists of 15 countries.
We need to take into account the fact that in the model we have abstracted from institutional
21The origin of the name is obscure and difficult to ascertain. The relationship became prominent following
Krueger (2012), though it was based on previous work by Corak (2013).
22As mentioned above Hassler et al. (2007) and Solon (2004), for instance, discussed the theoretical relationship
between inequality and mobility before this was documented by Corak
23We use the intersection of the sets of countries which appear in the Corak (2013) data, and in the OECD
data. The only country at a different stage of development which exists in this intersection is Chile, which is
then excluded.
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Country ρ Vy Education share of GDP
PreTax PostTax TotalEd PrivateEd
Australia 0.26 0.777494 0.375999 5.51% 1.34%
Canada 0.19 0.669317 0.340614 5.77% 0.70%
Denmark 0.15 0.563195 0.190069 8.05% 1.49%
Finland 0.18 0.783977 0.230952 5.60% 0.40%
France 0.41 0.837894 0.282429 6.07% 0.63%
Germany 0.32 0.885219 0.2708 4.87% 0.22%
Italy 0.50 0.87078 0.332033 5.12% 0.82%
Japan 0.34 0.859455 0.375552 5.91% 1.93%
New Zealand 0.29 0.730179 0.362101 6.51% 1.18%
Norway 0.17 0.576651 0.203958 5.16% 0.09%
Spain 0.40 0.746395 0.328532 4.98% 0.59%
Sweden 0.27 0.628584 0.21964 5.96% 0.00%
Switzerland 0.46 0.467887 0.292865 5.23% 0.08%
United Kingdom 0.50 0.941469 0.391376 5.38% 1.08%
United States 0.47 0.851498 0.484567 7.00% 1.47%
Table 1: International Data
differences across countries. In particular we have abstracted from (i) taxation and redistribution,
and (ii) procurement of public education. Both of these are of obvious importance, and both
affect the quantitative implications of the model. The only reason for not incorporating these in
the model is that it would have impeded us in obtaining analytic results. Including these features
while preserving the log-linear nature of the model (which enables analytical tractability), is a
complicated task that is part of our future research on this topic. For the present paper, instead
of developing such an extended theory, we opt to adapt the data to our model. That is, we fit
the model to (1) both the distribution of income before and after taxes, and to (2) both the
investment in private education and in total education (i.e. both private plus public education
spending). The qualitative results are robust to any of the four possible data configurations.
Given that the intention of our exercise is not to provide a numerical value of the degree of
“meritocracy”, but rather to show that our way to looking at the problem can be potentially
important, we believe that this should suffice to convince the reader. Notice, in any case, that
the relationship between mobility and inequality seems to be essentially the same irrespectively
of whether you look at income before or after taxes and redistribution.
In table 1 we present our data. The Corak (2013) data on mobility (ρ) is defined as specified
in the model and we use it as it is. We map the GINI coefficient of the distribution of income
(provided by the OECD) into the variance of log income under the assumption that income is
lognormally distributed.24 The OECD data allows us to do this for the distributions of income
both before and after taxes and redistribution.
In order to proxy for human capital investment we use either the total educational spending,
or private educational spending, divided by GDP (all figures from the OECD). However, spending
on human capital accumulation for children is larger, perhaps substantially larger, than what
is spent in formal schooling. It includes, for instance, the spending on real-estate incurred in
order to enjoy the externalities generated from the presence of high income students in the
24Specifically, we invert the relationship: GINI = 2Φ
(
σy√
2
)
− 1. See Aitchison & Brown (1963)
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neighborhood, or the spending on extra-curricular activities (from violin lessons to trips to
museums). We have no way of including data on all these activities. It is reasonable to expect,
nevertheless, that total spending will be related to formal education spending. Thus, we use the
variation in this spending but do not fit to the level of this spending.25
Thus, we have four data configurations: (pre-tax income, total educational spending), (post-
tax income, total educational spending), (pre-tax income, private educational spending) and
(post-tax income, private educational spending). In each of them we apply the same calibration
procedure for selecting (V jm, V
j
a ), ∀j, but we do not adjust α or Vω.
9.3 Results
In figure 2 we plot the implied rewards to merit and advantage (in panel (a)), and the implied
precision26 of both signals (in panel (b)) using the income distribution before taxes and the total
spending on education.
As can be seen from these charts, there are countries for which the unconditional effect of
background on income is high, while the effect conditional on the individual’s observed abilities
is very low. For example, we know that parental background matters a lot in the US relative
to other countries because that is precisely what it means for mobility to be low. Moreover, in
the numerical exercise the imputed precision of the signal on background is among the highest.
Nevertheless, the implied reward of having a good background βˆa is among the lowest. The
reason is that the implied precision of the direct objective signal on the productive ability of
individuals is so much higher in the US than anywhere else. This results in very large rewards
to merit βm, and a very low rewards to background, βˆa. The unconditional effect of background
is large, but the effect conditional on ability is very small.
This is perhaps our most important insight: rewards to merit may be very large whilst there
is a low degree of mobility. Large rewards to merit will cause low mobility and high inequality.
Moreover, that is how the model reads the situation in the US.
Italy and the US look very similar in the before tax Great Gatsby curve, but they are very
far apart in the maps of imputed rewards and precisions generated using the same before tax
data. The reason is that they are very different in the educational effort that their citizens make.
The US invests in education much more than the average country, while Italy is unremarkable in
this respect. The model interprets this as indicating that the return to educational investment
must be perceived as larger in the US, which is what happens if the precision of the merit signal
is larger in the US.
25More precisely, we define a variable kj for each country j equal to the standardized (i.e. zero mean and unit
variance) educational spend. We then define λˆj = µ + σkj as our proxy to the values of the data moment, and
our empirical counterpart to λj . µ and σ are chosen by the calibration routine in order to equalize the mean and
variance of the “empirical” value of λˆj with its model counterpart. Our goal in the calibration is to maximize
the correlation between empirical and model variables across locations, and therefore the inclusion of µ and σ is
innocuous except for the mostly aesthetic effect of equalizing the distribution of empirical and model moments:
this does not affect the correlation across countries. We consider the true, total, human capital investment effort,
λˆ, to be a linear transformation of the data, with the values of the transformation (µ and σ) being obtained from
the numerical fit to the data. Notice again that µ or σ only adjust the mean and variance of λ across countries
between model and data, but their value does not affect the correlations, and in this respect they are there for
aesthetic value.
26Where the precision of a signal I ∈ {A,M}, PI ≡ − lnVI , is used to make the graph more readable.
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(a) Rewards to merit and background βjm, βˆ
j
a
(b) Precisions of signals on merit and background P jm, P
j
a
Figure 2: Implied Rewards and Precisions of Merit and Background signals for all countries for
the income distribution before taxes and total educational investment.
28
This is what differentiates the US: it invests a lot in education (see in table 1). Two countries
which are very close on the Great Gatsby curve may have arrived at this point via very different
routes. In particular, the model suggests that more accurate objective information on the ability
of workers, larger rewards to merit, and less reward to background conditional on merit, is seen
in countries that invest more in education. This generates the larger demand for educational
investment.
Note however that the model is not a map from educational investment into the quality of
the signal on workers’ ability. This is very clear when comparing the US and Denmark in the
numerical exercise. Denmark is the only country with a larger educational effort than the US. In
spite of this, the model imputes lower precision on both signals to Denmark, as this is the only
way of making the model results compatible with the low inequality and high mobility observed
in the data.
In figure 3 we present the result of the same exercise performed under alternative data
configurations. Qualitatively the same results arise, and although the behavior of the US is
somewhat less radical, it is always among the countries with the highest precision on the merit
signal, and its largest reward. With respect to Italy, the US always puts considerably more
value on merit, and there is less prevalence of background conditional on merit. With respect
to Denmark, the US always has larger values of the precision of both signals and larger rewards
to both signals.
The main point of this section is that, when confronted with data, the suggestions of the
paper seem at least plausible. A naive interpretation of intergenerational mobility as the de-
gree of “meritocracy” may be a dangerous oversimplification. The US might still be a land of
opportunities conditional on having the right ability. Of course, those abilities are to a large
extent inherited, and that is the reason why the intergenerational persistence of income is so
large. But notice that the reason why they are so inheritable might be precisely that merit is
highly rewarded; that, in a deep sense, the US is a very meritocratic society.
10 Summary, Conclusion and Further Research
Our main contribution is perhaps to remark that “merit” – understood as rewarding individuals
by their productive ability – is not at all in contradiction to having very low intergenerational
mobility. Very much the opposite.
Measures of intergenerational mobility do not control for the productive ability of individuals.
They simply measure how much children’s outcomes are explained by those of their parents.
Parental outcomes may be strongly correlated with those of their children when not conditioning
on productive ability, but the partial correlation may be very small when conditioning on ability.
Obviously, in such a case productive ability is what is inherited from the parents.
It is perhaps not surprising that in the model of statistical discrimination that we have
presented, societies endowed with a better ability to judge people’s background are bound to
have larger inequality and lower mobility than otherwise. This is because more information
facilitates discrimination favoring those with more privileged backgrounds.
It is more surprisingly that an increase in the ability of society to judge any individual’s
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(a) βm, βˆa. After taxes. Total education. (b) Pm, Pa. After taxes. Total education.
(c) βm, βˆa. Before taxes. Private Education. (d) Pm, Pa. Before Taxes. Private Education.
(e) βm, βˆa. After taxes. Private education. (f) Pm, Pa. After taxes. Private education.
Figure 3: Implied Rewards and Precisions across countries for other data configurations.
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productivity also translates into larger differences in the income of agents and lower mobility.
Larger inequality translates across generations for two reasons: (1) human capital investment
decisions transform larger differences in parents into larger differences in their children’s abilities;
and (2) via a feedback mechanism by which the larger the degree of inequality, the more weight
society puts on any available information about an individual, generating further inequality and
hence further reducing mobility.
Inheritance is ingrained in the process by which inequality translates into lower mobility.
It hinges on the fact that more inequality in the income of the parents translates into more
inequality in the human capital of their children. Because it does, more access to information
not only feeds into more inequality, but also into linkages across generations. Both things
(inequality and lack of mobility) positively correlate with each other, but they could be caused
either by a prevalence of merit or by a prevalence of inherited advantages.
Nevertheless, there is an important aspect in which the accuracy of the information on merit
and background have differential effects: accurate information on human capital increases the
return to educational investment. It encourages human capital accumulation because you know
that your children are going to be paid according to their productivity, something that you can
affect by investing in education. More accurate information on background has a much milder
effect on the incentives to invest.
This difference has allowed us to conduct an interesting numerical exercise: seeing how
the model reads the data on inequality, intergenerational mobility, and educational investment
across countries. Independently of its empirical value, it is a good example of the mechanisms
underlying our model.
Conducting this exercise shows that it may very well be the case that in societies where
parental income has a very large unconditional effect on a child’s income, this same parental
income may have a very small effect when controlling for the abilities of the child. Thus, the
US shows very little mobility when compared with most other developed countries, while the
inferred rewards to merit are among the largest.
Two societies that look similar in the Great Gastby Curve, may look very different in the
space defined by the rewards to merit and background, and this may be reflected in the efforts
that they make with regard to educational investment. For instance, the US and Italy look very
much the same in respect to their levels of inequality and mobility, but the US invests much
more in education. Consequently, the model reads the data as saying that merit is much more
highly rewarded in the US than in Italy.
A society may have much higher rewards to merit, and lower rewards to advantages, than an-
other that is much more equal and that has much more intergenerational mobility. For instance,
the implied prevalence of merit in the US is larger than in Denmark, albeit it is much more
unequal and less mobile. This is interesting because Denmark is the one country in the sample
that has more investment in education (both public and private) that the US. The reason for
getting this ranking is that in order to exhibit the low inequality and high mobility of Denmark,
the model cannot reward the human capital signal very highly. When we simulate the model, a
consequence of having accurate information on the people’s productivity is to be at the dismal
end of the Great Gatsby Curve, as the US is in the data.
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Of course, many caveats to our model and its implementation have to be made.
We model the first years of active life of individuals in the labor market, and we simply
assume that their effects last forever. A more complete model would allow either for task
specific learning (which makes initial perceptions have permanent effects), or would allow for path
dependence in the human capital accumulation process (e.g. the specific high school attended,
or grades achieved, determining the quality of the university attended, itself having permanent
labor market effects). We did not include these more complicated mechanisms in our model for
simplicity and tractability, but we plan to explore them in further work.
Likewise, we did not include any consideration of public education or redistribution in our
analysis. Including them in our model would reduce inequalities in the acquisition of human
capital and, by disconnecting human capital from parental income, it would also reduce the
persistence of these inequalities across generations. Their introduction would affect the quanti-
tative aspects of the model, which is why we think of our numerical exercise more as an informed
example of the workings of the model rather than a measurement exercise. It is natural to think
of extensions of the model including both, and any real empirical implementation would need to
have both.
Still, notice that including redistribution and public education would not affect any of the
points that we made, which are qualitative, not quantitative. Insofar as richer parents invest in
their children more than poorer parents, more information (either on background or on merit)
will contribute to furthering inequalities and making them more persistent. For our mechanism
not to be present, either redistribution should be absurdly large (making everybody equal after
taxes) or it should be made impossible for parents to invest in their children’s27 education, which
seems equally far fetched.
There are other extensions of the paper that are also naturally appealing. The statistical
discrimination structure of the model could be used to model conspicuous consumption: agents
could invest in their appearance in order to “look” as though they have good backgrounds. It
would also be very interesting to use independent information on individuals’ ability (obtained
from educational scores or IQ tests) and systematically measure the effect of background on
outcomes across countries conditioning and not conditioning on those measures of ability. All
these are projects that we plan to develop in further research.
27Including investments in where to live. In the presence of externalities in human capital acquisition, parents
will segregate according to income. See for instance the seminal paper by Benabou (1993), and the large literature
thereafter.
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Appendix
A Proof of Result 1
Proof. We solve the program:
W
(
Y it
)
= max
Xit
{
ln
[
Y it −Xit
]
+
1
1 + δ
EW
(
eγ0
(
Y it
)γ1 (
Xit
)γ2
eε
i
t
)}
(38)
First we prove that parents invest a fixed percentage of their income in their children:
Xit = λY
i
t (39)
To do so we guess
W
(
Y it
)
= A+B lnY it (40)
which we will later verify. The Euler equation is:
1
Y it −Xit
=
1
1 + δ
∂EW
(
eγ0
(
Y it
)γ1 (
Xit
)γ2 eεit)
∂Xit
(41)
Since,
EW
(
eγ0
(
Y it
)γ1 (
Xit
)γ2
eε
i
t
)
= A+B
[
ε¯+ γ0 + γ1 lnY
i
t + γ2 lnX
i
t
]
(42)
the Euler equation becomes:
1
Y it −Xit
=
1
1 + δ
Bγ2
1
Xit
(43)
implying,
Xit =
Bγ2
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
Y it (44)
and
Cit =
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
Y it (45)
Now, substituting Xit into the expectation we get:
EW
(
Y it+1|Y it , Xit
)
= EW
(
eγ0
(
Y it
)γ1 (
Xit
)γ2
eε
i
t
)
(46)
= A+B
[
ε¯+ γ0 + (γ1 + γ2) lnY
i
t + γ2 ln
Bγ2
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
]
(47)
and the value function will be:
W
(
Y it
)
= ln
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
+ lnY it +
A
(1 + δ)
(48)
+
B
(1 + δ)
[
ε¯+ γ0 + (γ1 + γ2) lnY
i
t + γ2 ln
Bγ2
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
]
(49)
So, if the guess is right:
A = ln
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
+
A
(1 + δ)
+
B
(1 + δ)
[
ε¯+ γ0 + γ2 ln
Bγ2
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
]
(50)
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and
B =
B
(1 + δ)
(γ1 + γ2) + 1 (51)
Solving for B
B =
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2) (52)
which should be positive. We will show that the equilibrium values of γ1 and γ2 are always such that
this happens. Finally, solving for A
δA = (1 + δ) ln
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
+
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)
[
ε¯+ γ0 + γ2 ln
Bγ2
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
]
(53)
It is useful to notice that
1− λ = (1 + δ)
(1 + δ) +Bγ2
=
(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)
(1 + δ)− γ1 = 1−
γ2
[(1 + δ)− γ1] (54)
so:
λ =
γ2
[(1 + δ)− γ1] (55)
δA = (1 + δ) ln
[
1− γ2
[(1 + δ)− γ1]
]
+
(1 + δ)
(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)
[
ε¯+ γ0 + γ2 ln
γ2
[(1 + δ)− γ1]
]
(56)
A =
ε¯+ γ0 + ln [(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)][(1+δ)−(γ1+γ2)] + ln γ
γ2
2
[(1+δ)−γ1]
[(1+δ)−γ1]
[(1 + δ)− (γ1 + γ2)] δ1+δ
(57)
B Proof of Result 2
Proof. This follows directly from the human capital accumulation equation 6 and the investment rule,
Xit = λY
i
t .
C Proof of Result 3
Proof. Since (hit+1, a
i
t+1,m
i
t+1) has a multivariate normal distribution, we can appeal to the conditional
normal p.d.f. to find the distribution of hit+1|Ωit+1.
Let X be a partitioned multivariate normal random vector with XT =
[
X1 X
T
2
]
, where X1 =
[
hit+1
]
and XT2 =
[
ait+1 m
i
t+1
]
. The mean of X is given by:
µ =
[
µ1
µ2
]
(58)
where µ1 = [µh] and µ
T
2 = [µy µh].
The variance-covariance matrix of X is given by:
Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
(59)
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where:
Σ11 =
[
Vh
]
(60)
Σ12 =
[
αVy Vh
]
= ΣT21 (61)
Σ22 =
[
Vy + Va αVy
αVy Vh + Vm
]
(62)
Then the distribution of hit+1 conditional on Ω
i
t+1 is univariate normal with the following mean and
variance:
E
(
hit+1|Ωit+1
)
(63)
= µ1 +Σ12Σ
−1
22 (x2 − µ2) (64)
= µh +
1
(Vh + Vm) (Vy + Va)− α2V 2y
[
αVy Vh
] [ Vh + Vm −αVy
−αVy Vy + Va
] [
ait+1 − µy
mit+1 − µh
]
(65)
= µh + αβa (1− βm)
[
ait+1 − µy
]
+ βm
[
mit+1 − µh
]
(66)
= βmm
i
t+1 + (1− βm)
[
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ αβaa
i
t+1 + α (1− βa)µy
]
(67)
and,
V ar
(
hit+1|Ωit+1
)
(68)
= Σ11 −Σ12Σ−122 Σ21 (69)
= Vh − 1
(Vh + Vm) (Vy + Va)− α2V 2y
[
αVy Vh
] [ Vh + Vm −αVy
−αVy Vy + Va
] [
αVy
Vh
]
(70)
= Vh − α2Vyβa (1− βm)− βmVh (71)
= α2Vy (1− βm) (1− βa) + (1− βm)Vω (72)
= βmVm (73)
D Proof of Result 4
Proof. Given the conditional distribution of the log of human capital is normal, the conditional distri-
bution of human capital is log normal with mean:
Y it+1 = E
(
exp
{
hit+1
} |Ωit+1) = exp{µhit+1|Ωit+1
}
exp
{
Vhit+1|Ωit+1
2
}
(74)
Substituting and taken logarithms produces expression 20.
E The Multiplier Effect
This appendix proves the existence of the multiplier effect described in section 6 and calculates its
magnitude.
Proof. Imposing the steady state condition, Vyt = Vyt−1 = Vy on the law of motion of the variance of
log income given in equation 22, gives:
Vy = α
2 [βa(1− βm) + βm]Vy + βmVω (75)
Solving this gives the equation for steady state variance of log income given in result 5. We will call
the right-hand side of equation 75: Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α).
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We can then examine two things: the shift in Ψ from a change in one of the exogenous parameters,
keeping Vy fixed; and the total derivative of Vy with respect to the same parameter. The ratio of the
latter to the former is the multiplier.
Take Va as an example. For a given Vy, the effect of a change in Va on the Ψ function is given by:
∂Ψ
∂Va
=
∂Ψ
∂βa
∂βa
∂Va
+
∂Ψ
∂βm
[
∂βm
∂Va
+
∂βm
∂βa
∂βa
∂Va
]
(76)
This is the partial effect for a fixed Vy. Allowing Vy to fully adjust however, we find the effect of a
change in Va to be:
dVy
dVa
=
∂Ψ
∂Vy
dVy
dVa
+
∂Ψ
∂βa
dβa
dVa
+
∂Ψ
∂βm
dβm
dVa
=
[
∂Ψ
∂Vy
+
[
∂Ψ
∂βa
+
∂Ψ
∂βm
∂βm
∂βa
]
∂βa
∂Vy
]
dVy
dVa
+
∂Ψ
∂βa
∂βa
∂Va
+
∂Ψ
∂βm
[
∂βm
∂Va
+
∂βm
∂βa
∂βa
∂Va
]
=
1
1−
[
∂Ψ
∂Vy
+
[
∂Ψ
∂βa
+ ∂Ψ
∂βm
∂βm
∂βa
]
∂βa
∂Vy
] {[ ∂Ψ
∂βa
+
∂Ψ
∂βm
∂βm
∂βa
]
∂βa
∂Va
+
∂Ψ
∂βm
∂βm
∂Va
}
(77)
The first term on the right-hand side (i.e the fraction) is the multiplier term. The second term is
the shift in the Ψ curve calculated in 76. If the multiplier is greater than 1, it tells us that the total
(or long-run) effect on Vy of a change in Va is larger than the partial effect when Vy is fixed (or the
short-run effect, since Vy,t−1 is fixed).
By substitution, the multiplier term is:
1
1− α2
[
1− (1− βa)2 (1− βm)2
] > 1 (78)
Thus any change in Va is amplified since the additional discrimination which it creates feeds into
next period’s income variance and the levels of discrimination which individuals in that generation are
subjected to.
We can carry out exactly the same exercise for Vm, Vω and α. Although the partial effect of a
change in each of the parameters differs, the multiplier is the same in each case. In all cases it is given
by equation 78.
F Proof of Result 5
Proof. Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α) is defined as in appendix E. It follows that:
dΨ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
dVy
(79)
=
∂Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
∂Vy
+
∂Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
∂βa
dβa
dVy
+
∂Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
∂βm
dβm
dVy
(80)
= α2 [βa(1− βm) + βm] + α2(1− βm)Vy dβa
dVy
+
[
α2βaVa + Vω
] dβm
dVy
(81)
Since,
dβa
dVy
=
1− βa
Vy + Va
> 0 (82)
and,
dβm
dVy
= α2
(1− βm) (1− βa)2
α2βaVa + Vω + Vm
> 0 (83)
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Figure 4: Law of motion of Vy
it follows that,
dΨ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
dVy
= α2 [βa(1− βm) + βm] {1 + (1− βm) (1− βa)} (84)
= αρ [1 + (1− βm) (1− βa)] > 0 (85)
while the second derivative is:
d2Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
dV 2y
=
∂
[
dΨ(Vy ,βa,βm,Vω ,α)
dVy
]
∂βa
dβa
dVy
+
∂
[
dΨ(Vy ,βa,βm,Vω ,α)
dVy
]
∂βm
dβm
dVy
(86)
= 2α2 (1− βa) (1− βm)
[
(1− βm)dβa
dVy
+ (1− βa) dβm
dVy
]
> 0 (87)
We also know that:
Ψ(0, βa, βm, Vω, α) =
V 2ω
Vω + Vm
(88)
Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)→∞ as Vy →∞ (89)
dΨ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α)
dVy
→ α2 as Vy →∞ (90)
Since Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α) starts above the 45 degree line, is upward sloping and convex in Vy, and
has a maximum slope of α2 < 1, it must cut the 45 degree line once from above. This gives the unique,
stable, steady state value of Vy. The determination of the steady state is illustrated in figure 4.
Note that the shape of the curve implies there will be a multiplier effect from changes in the
parameters. Any parameter change which causes a shift in Ψ(Vy, βa, βm, Vω, α) will lead to a larger
change in Vy. This multiplier effect was described in appendix E and will be discussed further when we
consider the comparative statics of the model.
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G Proof of Result 6
Proof. Notice:
dβa
dVa
=
∂βa
∂Vy
dVy
dVa
+
∂βa
∂Va
=
1
Vy + Va
[
(1− βa) dVy
dVa
− βa
]
(91)
and
dβm
dVa
=
∂βm
∂βa
dβa
dVa
+
∂βm
∂Va
=
α2(1− βm)
α2βaVa + Vω + Vm
[
(1− βa)2 dVy
dVa
+ β2a
]
(92)
So, after some algebra
dVy
dVa
=
−α2β2a(1− βm)2
1− αρ [1 + (1− βm) (1− βa)] (93)
Note also that:
1− αρ [1 + (1− βm) (1− βa)] = 1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]
> 0 (94)
Therefore, the effect of a change in Va on Vy is:
dVy
dVa
=
−α2β2a(1− βm)2
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
] < 0 (95)
The effects of a change in Va on βa and βm are:
dβa
dVa
= −βa(1− βa)
Va
[
1 +
α2βa(1− βa)(1− βm)2
(1− α2) + α2(1− βa)2 (1− βm)2
]
< 0 (96)
= −βa(1− βa)
Va

 1− α2
[
1− (1− βa) (1− βm)2
]
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 (97)
dβm
dVa
=
α2β2a(1− βm)2
Vm

 1− α2
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 > 0 (98)
The extent to which firms value and use the signal on background is not measured by βa but by
βˆa = αβa (1− βm). A change in the precision of the advantage signal has the following effect on βˆa:
dβˆa
dVa
= α (1− βm) dβa
dVa
− αβadβm
dVa
< 0 (99)
The effect of a change in Va on ρ is:
dρ
dVa
= α (1− βm) dβa
dVa
+ α (1− βa) dβm
dVa
(100)
= − αβa (1− βa) (1− βm)
2
VaVm
[
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]] (101)
.
{(
1− α2) (Vω + Vm) + α2(1− βa) (1− βm)Vm} < 0 (102)
H Proof of Result 7
Proof. Notice that:
dβa
dVm
=
∂βa
∂Vy
dVy
dVm
=
(1− βa)
Vy + Va
dVy
dVm
(103)
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and
dβm
dVm
=
∂βm
∂βa
dβa
dVm
+
∂βm
∂Vm
(104)
=
α2(1− βa)2(1− βm)
α2βaVa + Vω + Vm
dVy
dVm
− βm
α2βaVa + Vω + Vm
(105)
Then,
dVy
dVm
=
−β2m
1− αρ [1 + (1− βm) (1− βa)] (106)
As above:
1− αρ [1 + (1− βm) (1− βa)] = 1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]
(107)
Therefore, the effect of a change in Vm on Vy is:
dVy
dVm
= − β
2
m
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
] < 0 (108)
The effects of a change in Vm on βa and βm are:
dβa
dVm
= −(1− βa)
2
Va

 β2m
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 < 0 (109)
dβm
dVm
= −βm (1− βm)
Vm

1 + α2βm(1− βm) (1− βa)2
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 < 0 (110)
The effect of a change in Vm on ρ is:
dρ
dVm
= α (1− βm) dβa
dVm
+ α (1− βa) dβm
dVm
(111)
= −αβm (1− βa) (1− βm)
VaVm

Va + (1− βa)βmVm[1− α2 [1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2]]

 < 0 (112)
Now turning to the effect on βˆa. A change in the precision of the ability signal has the following effect
on βˆa:
dβˆa
dVm
= α (1− βm) dβa
dVm
− αβa dβm
dVm
(113)
=
αβm (1− βm)
VaVm
[
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]] {βaVa (1− α2)− Vω (1− βm) (1− βa)2} (114)
This is ⋚ zero if:
βaVa
(
1− α2) ⋚ Vω (1− βm) (1− βa)2 (115)
There is a turning point at Vˆm where Vˆm gives values of βa and βm which solve the following equation:
βaVa
(
1− α2) = Vω (1− βm) (1− βa)2 (116)
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The left-hand side of the above equation is decreasing in Vm while the right-hand side is increasing.
Therefore Vˆm is a unique turning point and a maximum:
d
[
βaVa
(
1− α2)]
dVm
= Va
(
1− α2) dβa
dVm
< 0 (117)
d
[
Vω (1− βm) (1− βa)2
]
dVm
= −Vω(1− βa)
{
2 (1− βm) dβa
dVm
+ (1− βa)dβm
dVm
}
> 0 (118)
For values of Vm < Vˆm, βaVa
(
1− α2) > Vω (1− βm) (1 − βa)2 and dβˆadVm > 0.For values of Vm > Vˆm,
βaVa
(
1− α2) < Vω (1− βm) (1− βa)2 and dβˆadVm < 0.
I Proof of Result 8
Proof. From equation 20 we can see that:
yit+1 = (1− βm)
[
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ α (1− βa)µy
]
+
βmVm
2
(119)
+ αβa (1− βm) ait+1 + βmmit+1 (120)
Substituting for ait and m
i
t:
yit+1 = (1− βm)
[
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ α (1− βa)µy
]
+
βmVm
2
(121)
+ αβa (1− βm)
(
yit + ε
ia
t+1
)
+ βm
(
hit+1 + ε
im
t+1
)
(122)
Equation 6 then allows us to substitute for log human capital:
yit+1 = (1− βm)
[
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ α (1− βa)µy
]
+
βmVm
2
(123)
+ αβa (1− βm)
(
yit + ε
ia
t+1
)
+ βm
(
lnZ + α lnXit−1 −
Vω
2
+ ωit+1 + ε
im
t+1
)
(124)
It is then just a matter of rearranging to find γ0, γ1, γ2 and ε
yit =
{
lnZ + α (1− βm) [(1− βa)µy + lnλ] + 1
2
[βmVm − Vω]
}
(125)
+ αβa (1− βm) yit + αβm lnXit + αβa (1− βm) εiat+1 + βm
(
ωit+1 + ε
im
t+1
)
(126)
λ is found by substitution of γ1 and γ2 into equation 7. Note that γ1 + γ2 = ρ < 1 + δ as required to
ensure B is positive.
J Proof of Results 10 and 11
Proof.
λ =
βmα
1 + δ − (1− βm) α βa (127)
The partial derivatives of λ with respect to βm and βa are therefore:
∂λ
∂βm
=
α [(1 + δ)− αβa]
[1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2
> 0 (128)
∂λ
∂βa
=
α2βm (1− βm)
[1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2
> 0 (129)
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So:
dλ
dVm
=
α [(1 + δ)− αβa]
[1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2
dβm
dVm
+
α2βm (1− βm)
[1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2
dβa
dVm
< 0 (130)
With respect to Va:
dλ
dVa
=
α [(1 + δ)− αβa]
[1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2
dβm
dVa
− α
2βm (1− βm)
[1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2
dβa
dVa
(131)
=
α2βa (1− βm)
VaVm [1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2

α(1− α
2)βaVa(1− βm) [(1 + δ)− αβa]
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 (132)
− α
2βa (1− βm)
VaVm [1 + δ − (1− βm)αβa]2


(1− βa)βmVm
[
1− α2
[
1− (1− βa) (1− βm)2
]]
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 (133)
This is positive if:
α

 1− α2
1− α2
[
1− (1− βm)2 (1− βa)2
]

 (1− βm) > Vm
Vω
[
1− α2 [βa (1− βm) + βm]
[(1 + δ)− αβa]
]
(134)
Note that in the limit, as Vm → 0: βm = 1, 1−βmVm → ∞, and 0 < βa < 1. The above inequality then
holds.
K Privilege and Meritocracy
In this section we present an extension to the model where the children of the rich get an advantage
independently of how productive they are thought to be.
As in the main text, human capital is a function of parental investment in education, and parents
invest a fixed percentage of their income in education. Consequently, we can write the process of human
capital acquisition as:
H it+1 = A×
(
Y it
)α × eǫih,t+1 → hit+1 = lnA+ αyit + ǫiht+1 ; ǫiht+1 ∼ N (0, Vh) (135)
Also as in the main text, firms receive a signal on the human capital of agents. But, like in section
7.2 we assume that firms have no signal on the agent’s background (i.e., Va → ∞). Therefore, the
information available to the firm when forming an expectation about the agent’s human capital is
Ωipt+1 =
{
mit+1, µyt , Vyt
}
, where
mit+1 = h
i
t+1 + ǫ
im
t+1 (136)
The difference to the main text is that we assume that the pricing mechanism discriminates against
the poor. Not statistical discrimination, but raw preference-based discrimination. Firms somehow
prefer to hire the children of the rich even when conditioning on what one would rationally think about
their human capital. Formally, an agent with certain observable traits mit+1 and parental income Y
i
t
gets as income:
Y it+1 =
(
E
(
H it+1|Ωipt+1
))1−π
× (Y it )π × eǫiut+1 ; ǫiut+1 ∼ N (0, Vu) (137)
where π is a parameter measuring how much privilege the children of the rich enjoy. If the elasticity
of income to parental income when conditioning on expected human capital equals one, the income
process is exogenously determined to be a random walk, with maximal correlation between parental
and children’s income (and unconditional income variance approaching infinity). The polar opposite
case is the one that we study in the main text, where π = 0 and parental income is irrelevant given the
expectations on human capital.
Of course parental income could be used to form those expectations (as we do in the main text).
The difference now is that there is an advantage above and beyond the news that parental income may
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provide on human capital. Firms, thus, are inefficient in the sense of not maximizing profits because
they overpay employees who have rich parents. In Becker’s parlance they “prefer” to employ the
children of the rich, and are willing to pay them more for the same expected output. We do not explain
how it turns out that these firms exist, and why they are not driven to extinction by competitive firms
that do not prefer the children of the rich (like the ones in the main text). Notice that if there was any
information on parental income, the firms in the main text would also pay more to the children of the
rich, but not beyond their expected human capital.
Given this set up, it is straightforward to notice that if the distribution of log income among the
parents generation is yit ∼ N(µyt , Vyt), the prior (before observing mit+1) of the log of human capital of
a certain individual i is:
hit+1 ∼ N(lnA+ αµyt , α2Vyt + Vh) (138)
and the posterior (after observing a certain realization of mit+1) is:
hit+1|Ωipt+1 ∼ N
(
βt+1m
i
t+1 + (1− βt+1)(lnA+ αµyt) ,
(
α2Vyt + Vh
)
Vm
α2Vyt + Vh + Vm
)
(139)
with
βt+1 =
α2Vyt + Vh
α2Vyt + Vh + Vm
(140)
Thus,
logE
(
H it+1|Ωipt+1
)
= βt+1m
i
t+1 + (1− βt+1) (lnA+ αµyt) +
βt+1Vm
2
(141)
and
yit+1 = πy
i
t + (1− π)
[
βt+1m
i
t+1 + (1− βt+1) (lnA+ αµyt) +
βt+1Vm
2
]
+ ǫiut+1 (142)
which can be written in a Becker-Tomes form by substituting mit+1 for its value h
i
t+1 + ǫ
im
t+1 (and then
hit+1 by lnA+ αy
i
t + ǫ
ih
t+1):
yit+1 = (1− π)
[
lnA+ α(1− βt+1)µyt +
βt+1Vm
2
]
+ [π + (1− π)αβt+1] yit + (1− π)βt+1(ǫiht+1 + ǫimt+1) + ǫiut+1 (143)
Equation 143 determines a law of motion for the variance of log income, the persistence of the income
process and β:
Vyt+1 = (ρt+1)
2Vyt + (1− π)2(βt+1)2(Vh + Vm) + Vu (144)
ρt+1 = π + (1− π)αβt+1 (145)
βt+1 =
α2Vyt+Vh
α2Vyt+Vh+Vm
(146)
In this extension we solve numerically, not analytically, for the properties of the solution of this system.
It is easy to check numerically that
Result 12. As in our main model, in steady state, an exogenous increase in the degree of meritocracy
(a decrease of Vm) leads to a new steady state with a higher degree of intergenerational correlation (ρ),
greater weight given to the observable signal (β), and a higher degree of inequality (Vy).
The reasons are the same as in our main model: more meritocracy increases the differences between
agents, as they are paid more accurately according to their productive ability, and given that the children
of the rich are indeed on average more capable, this effect only increases the inequalities inherited via
the privilege channel. The increase in inequality increases the value that the market assigns to objective
information in the determination of the wage, β, increasing further the degree of inequality, etc...
This is the main result of this section: nothing of interest changes by introducing “irrational”
privilege, at least with respect to the effects of meritocracy. It still increases inequality and still
decreases mobility.
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L The Cost of Misallocation
One of the omissions from the original model is a cost associated with the misallocation of workers given
that firms do not perfectly observe their human capital. In equation 11, a worker’s output is assumed
to equal his human capital. This was done for simplicity. However, if a firm cannot perfectly identify
that human capital, it is likely that the agent will not be able to realise his full productive potential,
and all the moreso as the error in the firm’s belief grows. In this appendix, the role of allocating workers
to tasks is added into the model. It does not have any effect on the results presented in the body of
the paper.
In order to capture the role of allocation in production, a term A is added to the production function.
This allocative cost pulls the output of the worker down to below their full level of human capital. The
greater the error is firms’ beliefs, the greater the degree of misallocation and the lower the level of
output. Firms, as before, pay workers their expected output conditional on the available information
but taking into account that their output will be lowered by misallocation.
Y it+1 = E
[
A exp
{
hit+1
} |Ωit+1] (147)
A = exp
{
−θ
2
(
hit+1 − E(hit+1)
)2}
θ ∈ R+
The allocative cost is given by the square of the difference between actual and expected human
capital. An exogenous parameter θ can control the extent to which this misallocation impacts on
production. If θ is set equal to zero, this returns us to the model in the text.
Intuitively, since the human capital of any individual worker is unknown to the firm they cannot
make adjustments to the individual wages paid. They adjust everyone’s income by the same amount
depending on the aggregate amount of misallocation, which is itself an endogenous function of the
income distribution. As a result, the additional of this allocative cost impacts on the mean of income,
but not the intergenerational elasticity or inequality presented above. Thus the main results of the
paper are preserved without any adjustment.
The additional of A alters result 4 in the following way.
Result 13. Given the posterior belief about the log of human capital follows a normal distribution
hit+1|Ωit+1 ∼ N
(
µhit+1|Ωit+1 , Vhit+1|Ωit+1
)
(148)
and income is given by equation (147), it follows that:
Y it+1 =
1√
1 + θVhit+1|Ωit+1
exp
{
1
2
(
Vhit+1|Ωit+1
1 + θVhit+1|Ωit+1
)}
exp
{
µhit+1|Ωit+1
}
(149)
Proof. We need to calculate
Y it+1 = E
[
exp
{
hit −
θ
2
(
hit+1 − µhit+1|Ωit+1
)2}]
(150)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2π
√
Vhit+1|Ωit+1
exp

hit −
θ
2
(
hit − µhit+1|Ωit+1
)2
− 1
2
(
hit − µhit+1|Ωit+1
)2
Vhit+1|Ωit+1

 dhit (151)
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After some manipulation, this becomes:
Y it+1 =
1√
1 + θVhit+1|Ωit+1
exp
{
1
2
(
Vhit+1|Ωit+1
1 + θVhit+1|Ωit+1
)
+ µhit+1|Ωit+1
}
(152)
.
∫ ∞
−∞
1
√
2π
√
V
hit+1|Ω
i
t+1
1+θV
hit+1|Ω
i
t+1
exp


−1
2
(
hit −
[
µhit+1|Ωit+1 +
(
V
hit+1|Ω
i
t+1
1+θV
hit+1|Ω
i
t+1
)])2
(
V
hit+1|Ω
i
t+1
1+θV
hit+1|Ω
i
t+1
)


dhit (153)
The second term is equal to one, therefore income of individual i is given by:
Y it+1 =
1√
1 + θVhit+1|Ωit+1
exp
{
1
2
(
Vhit+1|Ωit+1
1 + θVhit+1|Ωit+1
)}
exp
{
µhit+1|Ωit+1
}
(154)
By taking logs of equation (149) and substituting from result 3 we can find the log income of
individual i with signals ait+1 and m
i
t+1:
yit+1 = (1− βm)
[
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω
2
+ α (1− βa)µy
]
− 1
2
[
ln (1 + θβmVm)− βmVm
1 + θβmVm
]
+ αβa (1− βm) ait+1 + βmmit+1 (155)
This is equivalent to equation (20) in the main body of the paper. Given that ait+1 and m
i
t+1 are
both stochastic functions of yit we can write the law of motion of the log of income:
yit+1 = lnZ + α lnλ−
Vω
2
+ α (1− βa) (1− βm)µy
− 1
2
[
ln (1 + θβmVm)− βmVm
1 + θβmVm
]
+ α [βa (1− βm) + βm] yit + αβa (1− βm) εiat+1 + βm
(
εimt+1 + ω
i
t+1
)
(156)
This is equivalent to equation (21) in the text. It can clearly be seen that the only role for misallo-
cation is in the intercept. As misallocation plays a larger role (θ is higher), mean log income is reduced,
as would be expected. The steady state equations for βa, βm, Vy and ρ are the same as those given in
result 5.
Result 14. Steady State with misallocation. Given the process of human capital accumulation in
equation (10), income given by equation (147), and the information set given by equation (12), there
exists a unique steady state which is globally stable. In the steady state log income is normally distributed
with variance being characterized by the (unique) solution of the following system of equations:
Vy =
βmVω
1− α2 [βa (1− βm) + βm] (157)
βa =
Vy
Vy + Va
(158)
βm =
α2 βa Va + Vω
α2 βa Va + Vω + Vm
(159)
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The steady state mean of log income and intergenerational correlation of income are given by:
µy =
lnZ + α lnλ− Vω2 − 12
[
ln (1 + θβmVm)− βmVm1+θβmVm
]
1− α (160)
ρ = α [βa (1− βm) + βm] (161)
Misallocation will push down median income (eµy) but will otherwise leave the steady state unaf-
fected. All of the results from sections 7.1 and 7.2 are preserved.
Similarly, misallocation will have a fairly limited impact on the equilibrium presented in section 8.
The γ0 term will be impacted upon by the degree of misallocation, but otherwise nothing is affected.
Result 15. Equilibrium with misallocation. The equilibrium stochastic process of income as a function
of parental income and investment is Y it+1 = e
γ0
(
Y it
)γ1 (Xit)γ2 eεit+1 with:
γ0 = lnZ + α (1− βm) [(1− βa)µy + lnλ]− 1
2
[
ln (1 + θβmVm)− βmVm
1 + θβmVm
+ Vω
]
(162)
γ1 = αβa (1− βm) (163)
γ2 = αβm (164)
εit+1 = αβa (1− βm) εait+1 + βm
(
ωit+1 + ε
mi
t+1
)
(165)
and, consequently, the equilibrium share of income invested in children’s education is:
λ =
αβm
1 + δ − αβa (1− βm) (166)
M Calibration using US Data
This appendix describes the procedure used, and results obtained, when we fit the model to US Com-
muting Zone data from Chetty et al. (2014). This exercise has certain advantages over the fit to
international data that we describe in the main text: more data/locations; and likely more consistent
data definitions across locations. However, we choose to use the international fit as it makes our rhetor-
ical point more eloquently, and it does not overplay this empirical application, which the model is not
really capable of supporting (due to its omission of public education and redistribution).
The results of this exercise are used to provide the central estimates for the global parameters α and
Vω, and are interesting in and of themselves. The measures (V
j
m and V
j
a , ∀j) obtained from fitting the
model seem to have reasonable correlations with other characteristics distributed across locations. Thus,
across US commuting Zones the prevalence of merit seems to correlate well with having a large service
sector and large foreign communities, while the fraction of African-Americans and racial segregation
correlates well with the prevalence of inherited advantages.
We describe the data, procedure, and results in order.
M.1 Data
We look at the configuration of meritocracy and advantages across the geography of the US using the
extraordinary data made available by Chetty et al. (2014).28 They use administrative data in order to
estimate intergenerational mobility in 741 US Commuting Zones. Moreover they report the degree of
inequality and education investment in each of them (along with many other variables).
Data on Inequality
Chetty et al. (2014) document the GINI index of the distribution of income at Commuting Zone
level. This is a different measure of inequality than the variance of log income, which is the one we use
in the model. In order to run the calibration procedure we translate the GINI index into the variance
28Data available from “Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez (2014): Descriptive Statistics by County and Com-
muting Zone”. Section of http://equality-of-opportunity.org/index.php/data
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of log income assuming that income is distributed lognormally.29 This data value for the variance of
log income across all locations, j, is labelled Vˆ jy .
Data on Intergenerational Mobility
The preferred measure of intergenerational mobility in Chetty et al. (2014) is the rank-rank correla-
tion, which looks at the persistence in the relative position in the income distribution, rather than the
parent-child income correlation. There are good reasons for centering in the rank-rank correlation, as
it controls better for the relatively scarce information on lifetime income of the children. Nevertheless,
this measure does not map directly into our model (or into any formal model that we know of), and it
seems reasonable to translate it into parent-child income correlation before calibrating the model.
We do so by determining which rank-rank correlation would be generated by an AR(1) process for
log income with normal shocks, and with exogenous mean, variance and autocorrelation. For given
mean and variance, we generate a map between the autocorrelation (which can be interpreted as the
parent-child income correlation) and the rank-rank correlation. Crucially, the relationship seems to be
both bijective and independent of the mean and variance, so we can then invert the relationship to map
rank-rank correlations into parent-child income correlations.
The relationship however is almost perfectly one for one (as it can be seen in figure 5), though this
will be conditional on the assumption of an AR(1) process for log income with normal shocks (as exists
in the model). This implies that there is almost no difference between using the rank-rank correlation
and the intergenerational correlation implied by the rank-rank correlation (under the assumptions that
hold in the model).30
Specifically, we have the Rank-Rank Slope, β1 from the Chetty et al. (2014) data, which is the
regression coefficient from rt+1i = β0 + β1r
t
i + ǫ
r
i , where r
t+1
i and r
t
i are the ranks in the income
distribution of children and parents respectively. What we would like to have is the intergeneration
income correlation, ρ, which is the regression coefficient from yt+1i = (1− ρ)y¯ + ρyti + ǫyi . If we assume
a lognormal distribution of income,
y = lnY ∼ N (y¯, Vy)
and, given large populations, we can assume perfect sampling from this distribution. The rank of a draw,
r(y), is therefore 1 minus the probability that any other draw is less than that i.e. r(y) = 1−Φ
(
y−y¯√
Vy
)
.
We can then simulate the income process using correlated random variables:
• Let Z1, Z2 ∼ N(0, 1)
• Define a sample of {yt, yt+1} based on a sample of {Z1, Z2} using the relationships:
yt = y¯ + V
1
2
y Z1
yt+1 = y¯ + ρV
1
2
y Z1 +
√
Vy (1− ρ2)Z2
• Then yt and yt+1 are distributed as required
• We can simulate a large number of realisations of {yt, yt+1}, and for each calculate the realisation
of {rt, rt+1} under the assumption of large populations.
• We can then measure the Rank-Rank correlation over the whole sample for given values of
{y¯, Vy, ρ}
• We produce a map between ρ and β1, β1 (y¯, Vy, ρ). This relationship seems to be independent of
y¯ and Vy, and it appears very close to a linear relationship i.e. β1 = β1 (y¯, Vy, ρ) ≈ β1 (ρ) ≈ ρ.
See figure 5
29Specifically, we invert the relationship: GINI = 2Φ
(
σy√
2
)
− 1. See Aitchison & Brown (1963)
30 We performed the same exercise directly using the rank-rank correlations instead of our transformation. The
calibrated parameters are almost identical, and the correlation of the values of βjm and βˆ
j
a with our benchmark
is greater than 97%.
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Figure 5: Mapping from rank-rank correlation (β1 in the x axis) into intergenerational income
correlation (ρ in the y axis)
• Given this independence upon y¯ and Vy, and the apparent bijectivity, we can invert the relation-
ship to obtain ρ = ρ(β1) as require (though as discussed, this is almost exactly the same as just
using ρ ≈ β1).
• This data value for the intergenerational income correlation across all locations, j, is labelled ρˆj .
Educational Investment
As an empirical counterpart to the share of income spent on human capital accumulation, λ, we
use a transformation of the ratio of spending per student on school education to the mean household
income for each Commuting Zone. The transformation, and its rationale, is as follows.
Spending on human capital accumulation for children is larger, perhaps substantially larger, than
what is spent in formal schooling. It includes, for instance, the spending in real-estate incurred in order
to enjoy the externalities generated from the presence of high income students in the neighborhood, or
the spending in extra-curricular activities (from violin lessons to trips to museums). We have no way
of including data on all this activities, and Chetty et al. (2014) only report on spending per pupil.
It is reasonable to expect, nevertheless, that total spending will be related to formal spending per
pupil. Thus, we define a variable kj for each commuting zone j equal to the standardized (i.e. zero
mean and unit variance) ratio of spending per student divided by mean household income. We then
define λˆj = µ+ σkj as our empirical counterpart to λj . µ and σ are chosen by the calibration routine
(see below) in order to equalize the mean and variance of the “empirical” value of λˆj with those of its
model counterpart.
M.2 Procedure
As described in the main text, we assume a discount rate of 1%p.a. and assume that a period/generation
is of the order of 30 years. This translates into an assumed value for δ = 0.348.
We further assume that all US Commuting zones share the same value of α and Vω, and we use the
following routine to fit values for α and Vω, as well as values for V
j
a and V
j
m for all locations, j, that
make the model closest to the data.
The routine also chooses values for µ and σ to equalize the mean and variance of the “empirical”
value of λˆj with those of its model counterpart. As described below, our goal in the calibration is
to maximize the correlation between empirical and model variables across locations, and therefore the
inclusion of µ and σ is innocuous except for the mostly aesthetic effect of equalizing the distribution of
empirical and model moments: this does not affect the correlation across commuting zones.
Not all cells in the data are populated, thus we eliminate all commuting zones on the basis of any
missing values in the variables needed to construct
{
Vˆ jy , ρˆj , kj : ∀j
}
. This leaves a data set of 701
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commuting zones.
Initial Conditions
• To generate initial conditions to start the calibration, we set:
µ = 0, σ = 1
α = 0.5
V ja = V
j
m = Vω = 1, ∀j
• Then change α and V ja = V jm = Vω, ∀j, so that ρ and Vy (the results for the model values across
locations will all be identical since we are setting all the variances equal to the same value) are
equal to the means of ρˆj and Vˆ jy .
• Then keeping α and Vω fixed, we choose, for each j,
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
to minimise
(
ln ρj − ln ρˆj)2 +(
lnV jy − ln Vˆ jy
)2
. This ensures that correlations between data and model ρ’s and Vy’s are well
defined rather than being divide by zero errors. i.e. in each location we have an initial local
calibration that matches local inequality and mobility but pays no attention to human capital
investment.
Model to data fitting algorithm
1. Ennumerate CZs from 1 to 701 (based simply on their ordering in the Chetty et al. (2014) dataset)
2. Let tol = 100
3. Starting from j = 1 and optimising individually up to j = 701, choose
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
to minimise the
following objective function31
Obj = (1− Corr [ρˆ, ρ])2 +
(
1− Corr
[
Vˆy, Vy
])2
+
(
1− Corr
[
λˆ, λ
])2
+
(
ln ρ¯D − ln ρ¯M)2 + (ln V¯ Dy − ln V¯My )2
4. Repeat 3. until Obj is stable (this should mean that the ordering of the CZs does not matter
particularly much), then save the matrix V aggMAT =
{(
V ja , V
j
m
)
: ∀j
}
5. Choose µ & σ so that the mean and standard deviation of the λˆ matches the modelled equivalents,
subject to the constraint that min
{
λˆj
}
≥ 0. NB It is always the case, independent of µ & σ > 0,
that Corr
[
k, λˆ
]
= 1.
6. This step attempts to reduce the size of any outliers by minimising square errors for any large
outliers. Starting from j = 1, check if Objj > tol, and if so choose
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
to minimise Objj .
Continue up to j = 701.
Objj = (ln(Vˆ jy )− ln(V jy ))2 + (ln(ρˆj)− ln(ρj))2 + (ln(λˆj)− ln(λj))2
Then save the matrix V outMAT = {
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
: ∀j} and corresponding Obj (V outMAT ).
31As described in the main text, we maximize the correlations, instead of minimizing the square errors, of
the moments to normalize the magnitudes of the three variables, giving them effectively equal weight. We can
therefore justify this choice, but there was a practical reason for choosing this in the first place. The routine
described in this appendix chooses {V ja , V jm : ∀j} conditional on α and Vω; it then looks for the movement in
(α, Vω) space that produces the biggest fall in the value of the objective function; this has the effect of prioritising
a calibration that reduces the biggest errors, but does not produce particularly high correlations across all those
locations that fit the data relatively well; targeting the correlations directly produces much higher correlations
across all locations at the expense of a global parameter set (α, Vω) that leaves several large outliers in which
model and data values do not match very well.
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7. Count the number of rows in which V aggMAT 6= V outMAT , repeat from 3. until this number is constant.
8. Let tol = 110 tol, then repeat from 3. until tol = 0.1
9. Let Inc = 10%
10. Repeat steps 2 to 8 four times for each of α→ min{0.9,max{0.1, α× or / (1 + Inc)}} and Vω →
max{0.001, Vω× or / (1 + Inc)}}, each time recording the value of V outMAT = {
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
: ∀j} and
corresponding Obj
(
V outMAT
)
.
11. Change global parameters to those corresponding to the lowest value of Obj
(
V outMAT
)
from the
last stage and repeat from stage 2.
12. If the lowest Obj
(
V outMAT
)
is the original (unaltered global parameters), or if we see any cyclical
sequences (i.e. where a parameter is increased by Inc followed by a decrease by Inc) then let
Inc = 110Inc and repeat from stage 2 (omitting 9) until Inc = 0.01%.
M.3 Calibration Results
In table 2 and figure 6 we report the calibrated parameters and the goodness of fit for the targeted
moments.
Each scatter plot draws the value of the data and the moment value for one of the targeted moments
in each of the CZs. In spite the high degree of freedom, the correlations are high and, less surprisingly,
the mean of ρ and Vy across CZ’s is pinpointed very accurately. Nevertheless, being targeted moments,
it is difficult to interpret this as goodness of fit.
The variances of ρ and Vy across CZ’s are the only untargeted moments that we have left. On this
we do quite well in the first, but less so in the second. The standard deviation of ρ in data is 0.060,
and in the model it’s remarkably close: 0.063. On the other hand, we do very poorly in the variance of
inequality across CZs, its standard deviation in the data is 0.304, and in the model it’s 0.095.
The calibrated values of α and Vω are 0.409 and 1.038 respectively.
We determine their geographical distribution, and we correlate the results with other macroeconomic
variables across commuting zones. Therefore we can look not only at the correlation of meritocracy
with advantages, but also at which other variables are correlated with each of them.
Instead of looking at the of V jm and V
j
a it is more convenient to look at the precisions. We define
P jm = − ln
(
V jm
)
and P ja = − ln
(
V ja
)
. Then, in figure 7 we plot the distribution of the implied precision
of the merit and background signals across all CZs, which visually suggests that they are negatively
correlated across CZs. This is indeed the case. In table 2 we show that more meritocratic places have
on average lower advantages: the correlation of Pa with Pm is negative, which translates into a negative
correlation of −.54 between the rewards on merit and background. This covariance between the two
sources of exogenous variation across CZs explains why when comparing across CZs:
• CZs with more information on background have less mobility, but also less inequality (positive
correlation between Pa and both data and modelled ρ, negative correlation between Pa and both
data and modelled Gini).
• CZs with more information on merit suffer more inequality but have almost no difference in
mobility (Pm is very positively correlated with both data and modelled Gini, but only very
marginally positively correlated with the model ρ, and very marginally negatively correlated
with the data ρˆ).
In figure 8 we plot the geographical distribution of our proxies for merit and reward, along with the
data values of mobility and inequality for comparison. Data is in green in quintiles: darkest (lightest)
green is highest (lowest) quintile of variable being mapped. We plot in red the CZs with insufficient
data. Here the same pattern is apparent. Due to the negative correlation between the two precisions,
the precision of merit signals seems to explain inequality better, while the precision of background
signals seems to explain mobility better.
It is also of interest to correlate the implied precision of both signals and the rewards to merit and
background to a relatively large set of Commuting Zone characteristics available from Chetty et al.
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Calibrated parameters
α = 0.409
Vω = 1.038
µ = 0.1694
σ = 0.0219
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Correlation at CZ level
data and model
Corr (ρˆ, ρ) = 0.84
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)
= 0.64
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)
= 0.64
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Model Data
E (ρ) 0.309 0.308
E (Vy) 0.613 0.616
'
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  Correlations
Pa Pm βˆa βm ρˆ Vˆy λˆ ρ Vy λ
Pa 100%
Pm −22% 100%
βˆa 87% −34% 100%
βm −42% 82% −54% 100%
ρˆ 68% −5% 77% −12% 100%
Vˆy −19% 66% −18% 62% 22% 100%
λˆ −2% 41% −17% 60% −10% −18% 100%
ρ 81% 3% 90% −12% 84% 11% 12% 100%
Vy −26% 83% −37% 98% 3% 64% 63% 7% 100%
λ −9% 79% −18% 92% 20% 64% 64% 26% 98% 100%
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters and Fitness of Targeted Moments.
Figure 6: Calibrated Common parameters & Model and Data Moments for all CZ.
Figure 7: Distribution of calibrated values of the precission of the signals: P jm and P
j
a for all
CZ’s.
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(a) Mobility, 1− ρ (b) Inequality, Gini Index.
(c) Precision of Advantage Signal (d) Precision of Merit Signal
(e) Reward to Advantage Signal, βˆa (f) Reward to Merit Signal, βm
Figure 8: Geographical patterns in the US
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Sample Correlations.
Mobility Gini Pa Pm βˆa βm
fraction black -62% 58% 24% 9% 25% 18%
racial segregation -43% 30% 12% 6% 19% 15%
fraction with commute 15 mins 47% -58% -12% -11% -21% -14%
household income per capita 13% -8% -10% -20% -2% -35%
state income tax progressivity 4% -19% 6% -10% 6% -18%
state eitc exposure 14% -31% 3% -7% 0% -9%
teacher student ratio 2% 16% -5% -12% -3% -18%
high school dropout rate income adjus -35% 47% 10% 17% 9% 23%
college graduation rate income adjus 4% -17% -2% -4% -2% -2%
labor force participation rate 32% -35% -11% -32% -7% -44%
manufacturing employment share -40% -3% 40% -16% 52% -32%
teenage labor force participation rate 52% -64% -13% -23% -16% -38%
migration inflow rate 24% 8% -24% -7% -25% -5%
migration outflow rate 27% 2% -22% -8% -27% -1%
fraction foreign born 29% 22% -31% 13% -30% 25%
social capital index 32% -66% 4% -29% 4% -46%
fraction of children with single mother -65% 62% 25% 17% 23% 31%
fraction of adults divorced -13% 20% -2% -5% 4% -5%
income growth 51% -35% -32% 2% -36% 2%
Partial Correlations.
Mobility Gini Pa Pm βˆa βm
fraction of black -13% 11% -4% -22% 3% -22%
-2.26 1.69 -0.42 -1.85 0.36 -2.93
racial segregation -30% 0% 9% -7% 19% -1%
-9.68 -0.10 1.75 -1.14 4.08 -0.23
fraction with commute 15 mins 17% -21% -19% -18% -21% -12%
3.37 -3.39 -2.26 -1.65 -2.75 -1.81
household income per capita 5% 17% -21% 8% -15% -8%
0.98 2.63 -2.38 0.70 -1.91 -1.16
state income tax progressivity -1% -6% 5% -12% 5% -18%
-0.30 -1.47 0.86 -1.74 1.08 -4.14
state eitc exposure 6% -7% -4% 7% -10% 17%
2.19 -2.01 -0.82 1.15 -2.43 4.42
teacher student ratio 23% -7% -8% -14% -12% -20%
6.33 -1.51 -1.28 -1.90 -2.24 -4.13
high school dropout rate income adjusted -5% 13% 3% 18% 0% 13%
-1.55 3.40 0.63 2.68 -0.04 3.11
college graduation rate income adjusted -1% 2% -12% 2% -9% 11%
-0.24 0.71 -2.62 0.41 -2.24 3.00
labor force participation rate 6% -8% 0% -30% -1% -18%
1.29 -1.48 0.01 -3.02 -0.14 -2.82
manufacturing employment share -24% -21% 32% -21% 48% -36%
-6.49 -4.64 5.12 -2.63 8.66 -7.31
teenage labor force participation rate 15% -17% 9% 10% 4% -10%
2.53 -2.49 0.93 0.81 0.42 -1.27
migration inflow rate -8% 14% -11% 7% -9% 9%
-1.51 2.18 -1.17 0.57 -1.03 1.28
migration outflow rate 12% -24% 10% -21% 7% -21%
2.55 -4.12 1.22 -2.05 0.91 -3.24
fraction foreign born 18% 19% -23% 8% -16% 22%
4.65 4.02 -3.51 0.99 -2.73 4.24
social capital index -25% -21% 31% -37% 38% -32%
-4.50 -3.18 3.37 -3.20 4.67 -4.36
fraction of children with single mother -24% 20% 21% 22% 12% 30%
-3.93 2.81 2.10 1.69 1.28 3.72
fraction of adults divorced -1% -9% -8% -34% 4% -27%
-0.26 -1.86 -1.16 -3.96 0.71 -4.98
income growth 13% 2% -19% 15% -12% 14%
3.35 0.43 -2.99 1.85 -2.14 2.70
R2 75% 68% 34% 27% 46% 59%
Table 3: 418 CZ without blank data. In the Partial Correlations panel each column is a different
LHS variable. In the first line of each row we place the coefficient of the variable (in %), in the
second line the t-statistic.
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(2014). In table 3 we do so for the 418 Commuting Zones that have information on all the properties
that we look at. We run a regression32 of these characteristics against both mobility and inequality in
each CZ, but also on Pa, Pm, βˆa and βm. We only report the values for those characteristics that are
significant in at least one regression.
Income level is negatively related to the precision of the signal on advantages, but is unrelated to
the precision of the signal on merit; while income growth is negatively related to the prevalence of
advantages and positively related to the prevalence of merit.
Racial segregation and the share of manufacturing, particularly the latter, seem to be among the
variables that correlate most highly with the precision of the background signal (and with its reward
βˆja). It also correlates negatively with the size of the foreign community in the CZ, and with educational
achievement indicators (the teacher student ratio and college graduation rate).
The share of manufacturing is also one of the better correlates with the precision of the merit signal,
but negatively. The fraction of foreign born strongly correlates positively. This suggest that areas with
relatively large service sectors and more migrants tend to be more meritocratic. The reward to merit
also decreases with the proportion of African Americans. Educational achievement (share of college
graduates) correlates positively with it, while tax progressivity does so negatively.
Finally, social capital seems to correlate positively with the incidence of background and negatively
withc the incidence of merit.
In table 4 we perform the same exercise in a sample including all the commuting zones but only
those characteristics for which there is data in all 701 locations. It shows the same general patterns.
Summarizing. When we calibrate our model to US data, the implied values of the precision of
the merit signal are negatively correlated with the implied precision of the background signal. The
prevalence of advantages due to background is very negatively correlated with the degree of mobility,
not so much to inequality. High rewards to merit, on the contrary, seem correlated to inequality but
only weakly with mobility. Racial characteristics of a CZ have the expected effects: segregation and
racial diversity increase the prevalence of advantage and decrease meritocracy. State tax progressivity is
negatively related to the precision of the merit signal. The productive structure of the commuting zone
is what most clearly correlates with both merit and advantages: manufacturing associates possitively
with advantages and negatively with merit. Finally, foreign migrants tend to live in CZs where the
implied precision of merit signals is high and background signals is low.
N Algorithm used for international data
As described in the main text, we assume a discount rate of 1%p.a. and assume that a period/generation
is of the order of 30 years. This translates into an assumed value for δ = 0.348.
We further assume that all countries share the same value of α and Vω.
The routine also chooses values for µ and σ to equalize the mean and variance of the “empirical”
value of λˆj with those of its model counterpart. As described below, our goal in the calibration is
to maximize the correlation between empirical and model variables across locations, and therefore the
inclusion of µ and σ is innocuous except for the mostly aesthetic effect of equalizing the distribution of
empirical and model moments: this does not affect the correlations across countries.
Initial Conditions
• To generate initial conditions to start the calibration, we set:
µ = 0, σ = 1
V ja = V
j
m = Vω, ∀j
• Choose, for each j,
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
to minimise
(
ln ρj − ln ρˆj)2 + (lnV jy − ln Vˆ jy )2. This ensures that
correlations between data and model ρ’s and Vy’s are well defined rather than being divide by
zero errors. i.e. in each location we have an initial local calibration that matches local inequality
and mobility but pays no attention to human capital investment.
32All variables in all exercises have been standardized by subtracting mean and dividing by standard deviation.
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Sample Correlations.
Mobility Gini Pa Pm βˆa βm
fraction black -57% 54% 25% 10% 25% 14%
racial segregation -41% 28% 14% 3% 22% 6%
fraction with commute 15 mins 41% -56% -8% -6% -18% -5%
household income per capita 17% 7% -17% -18% -9% -25%
local government expenditures per capita 31% -10% -21% 6% -26% 12%
state income tax progressivity 14% -8% -11% -7% -8% -9%
state eitc exposure 13% -25% 1% -4% -4% -4%
labor force participation rate 22% -26% -6% -29% -2% -35%
manufacturing employment share -44% -2% 39% -20% 51% -34%
teenage labor force participation rate 44% -58% -10% -22% -13% -30%
fraction foreign born 32% 30% -40% 18% -37% 30%
fraction religious 6% -29% 7% -11% 5% -17%
fraction of children with single mother -59% 58% 24% 19% 23% 27%
Partial Correlations.
Mobility Gini Pa Pm βˆa βm
fraction black -12% 17% 4% 1% 1% 0%
2.80 3.88 0.77 0.09 0.26 0.03
racial segregation -27% -3% 15% -1% 23% -1%
-9.89 -1.15 4.00 -0.36 6.49 -0.30
fraction with commute 15 mins 9% -25% 3% -7% 0% -1%
2.11 -5.33 0.58 -1.09 0.04 -0.19
household income per capita 3% 18% -10% -13% -2% -20%
0.75 4.75 -1.98 -2.41 -0.48 -4.33
local government expenditures per capita 6% -3% -4% 9% -8% 12%
2.11 -0.91 -1.06 2.09 -2.24 3.41
state income tax progressivity 5% -6% -4% -10% 0% -14%
1.92 -2.38 -1.27 -2.80 0.03 -4.70
state eitc exposure 6% -5% -3% 12% -13% 21%
2.29 -1.78 -0.75 2.98 -3.63 6.11
labor force participation rate 4% -12% 1% -22% 1% -19%
1.18 -3.30 0.17 -4.40 0.22 -4.48
manufacturing employment share -29% -15% 35% -19% 47% -33%
-10.50 -5.11 9.19 -4.60 13.66 -9.29
teenage labor force participation rate 2% -16% 12% -2% 12% -15%
0.35 -2.87 1.72 -0.24 1.86 -2.23
fraction foreign born 27% 21% -27% 17% -26% 27%
9.68 7.00 -7.18 4.20 -7.43 7.68
fraction religious -8% 3% 5% -6% 6% -10%
-2.92 0.85 1.25 -1.46 1.64 -2.85
fraction of children with single mother -29% 25% 18% 7% 14% 12%
-6.44 5.11 2.93 1.08 2.44 2.15
R2 65% 59% 34% 19% 44% 42%
Table 4: 701 CZ. In the Partial Correlations table each column is a LHS variable. In the first
line of each row we place the coefficient of the variable (in %), in the second line the t-statistic.
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Model to data fitting algorithm
1. Ennumerate countries from 1 to 15 alphabetically.
2. Let tol = 100
3. Starting from j = 1 and optimising individually up to j = 15, choose
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
to minimise the
following objective function.
Obj = (1− Corr [ρˆ, ρ])2 +
(
1− Corr
[
Vˆy, Vy
])2
+
(
1− Corr
[
λˆ, λ
])2
+
(
ln ρ¯D − ln ρ¯M)2 + (ln V¯ Dy − ln V¯My )2
4. Repeat 3. until Obj is stable (this should mean that the ordering of the countries does not matter
particularly much), then save the matrix V aggMAT =
{(
V ja , V
j
m
)
: ∀j
}
5. Choose µ & σ so that the mean and standard deviation of the λˆ matches the modelled equivalents,
subject to the constraint that min
{
λˆj
}
≥ 0. NB It is always the case, independent of µ & σ > 0,
that Corr
[
k, λˆ
]
= 1.
6. This step attempts to reduce the size of any outliers by minimising square errors for any large
outliers. Starting from j = 1, check if Objj > tol, and if so choose
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
to minimise Objj .
Continue up to j = 15.
Objj = (ln(Vˆ jy )− ln(V jy ))2 + (ln(ρˆj)− ln(ρj))2 + (ln(λˆj)− ln(λj))2
Then save the matrix V outMAT = {
(
V ja , V
j
m
)
: ∀j} and corresponding Obj (V outMAT ).
7. Count the number of rows in which V aggMAT 6= V outMAT , repeat from 3. until this number is constant.
8. Let tol = 110 tol, then repeat from 3. until tol = 0.1
O Sensitivity Analysis
Here we show the results obtained for the fit to international data, when the global parameters δ, α and
Vω are varied from their central assumptions. As can be seen the qualitative results appear relatively
insentive to changes in δ, α and Vω.
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(a) βm, βˆa. Central assumptions: δ = 0.348, α =
0.409 and Vω = 1.038.
(b) Pm, Pa. Central assumptions: δ = 0.348, α =
0.409 and Vω = 1.038.
(c) βm, βˆa. Low δ: δ = 0.25, α = 0.409 and Vω =
1.038.
(d) Pm, Pa. Low δ: δ = 0.25, α = 0.409 and Vω =
1.038.
(e) βm, βˆa. High δ: δ = 0.45, α = 0.409 and Vω =
1.038.
(f) Pm, Pa. High δ: δ = 0.45, α = 0.409 and Vω =
1.038.
Figure 9: Implied Rewards and Precisions across countries for other global parameter sets.
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(a) βm, βˆa. Low α: δ = 0.348, α = 0.3 and Vω =
1.038.
(b) Pm, Pa. Low α: δ = 0.348, α = 0.3 and Vω =
1.038.
(c) βm, βˆa. High α: δ = 0.348, α = 0.5 and Vω =
1.038.
(d) Pm, Pa. High α: δ = 0.348, α = 0.5 and Vω =
1.038.
(e) βm, βˆa. Low Vω: δ = 0.348, α = 0.409 and
Vω = 0.9.
(f) Pm, Pa. Low Vω: δ = 0.348, α = 0.409 and
Vω = 0.9.
(g) βm, βˆa. High Vω: δ = 0.348, α = 0.409 and
Vω = 1.1.
(h) Pm, Pa. High Vω: δ = 0.348, α = 0.409 and
Vω = 1.1.
Figure 10: Implied Rewards and Precisions across countries for other global parameter sets.
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